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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
DECISIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
MOLLY MOSLEY-GOREN*

INTRODUCTION

Peppered with colorful language and spiced with economic theory, the
Seventh Circuit's intellectual property (IP) law decisions of 2002 make zesty
reading. On balance, the decisions are a moderate presentation in terms of
new substantive law, following precedent for the most part. A notable
exception is the Seventh Circuit's pronouncement that, in copyright
infringement cases involving small damages amounts, the copyright owner
has a "presumptive entitlement" to an attorney fee award.' Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit signaled a renewed interest in substantive patent law by
suggesting that the United States Supreme Court overrule its decision in
Brulotte v. Thys Co.,2 which limited the period for collecting patent license
royalties to the life of the patent.3 Furthermore, the opinions include a useful

range of suggestions to IP attorneys on how best to proceed in this vibrant
circuit. This Article discusses the cases according to the primary subject
matter of the cases. Part I of this Article examines trends and statistics of the
Seventh Circuit's IP cases during the survey period. Part II reviews
trademark and trade dress decisions. Part III considers the Seventh Circuit's
copyright cases. Part IV is devoted to appeals in the area of trade secrets.
Part V is a brief discussion of patent pronouncements.
I.

SEVENTH CIRCUIT IP TRENDS AND STATISTICS

This article surveys twenty-seven IP or IP related decisions from the
Seventh Circuit. 4 Thirteen are on trademark and trade dress, seven are on
* Of Counsel, Fish & Richardson PC, Boston, Massachusetts.

The author welcomes

comments and can be contacted via e-mail at mosleygoren@fr.com. The author thanks
Heidi Harvey for her valuable comments. Many thanks to the editors and staff of The
John Marshall Law Review for their patience and assistance. The author particularly
wishes to express her gratitude to her lifelong editor, her mother Mary Mosley, for her
careful attention and ceaseless encouragement.
1. See infra notes 524-540 and accompanying text.
2. 379 U.S. 29 (1964): But see Meehan v. PPG Indus., 802 F.2d 881, 884 (7th Cir.
1986) (extending the Brulotte rule).
3. See infra notes 731-765 and accompanying text.
4. The Seventh Circuit reports appeals statistics on-line. See Annual Report, The
Judicial Business of the United States Courts of the Seventh Circuit (2002), available at
www.ca7.uscourts.gov/rpt/report2OO2/stats.htm. (last visited July 31, 2003).
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copyright, five are on trade secrets, and two are on patents. Many appeals
were decided on IP claims; several were decided on other claims. Eight
decisions fall under contract theory, respecting IP ownership, licensing or
franchising. Two decisions are criminal convictions for IP violations, one
for an Economic Espionage Act violation and one for trafficking counterfeit
computer software. Two appeals answer questions of insurance coverage of
IP claims.
IP opinions were authored by the Seventh Circuit judges 5 as follows:
Chief Judge Joel M. Flaum (one panel opinion and one concurrence), Senior
Judge Thomas E. Fairchild (none), Senior Judge William J. Bauer (two panel
opinions), Senior Judge Harlington Wood, Jr. (one panel opinion), Senior
Judge Richard D. Cudahy (no panel opinions but one dissent), Richard A.
Posner (nine panel opinions), John L. Coffey (none), Frank H. Easterbrook
(five panel opinions), Kenneth F. Ripple (two panel opinions and one
concurrence), Daniel A. Manion (one panel opinion), Michael S. Kanne (two
panel opinions), Ilana Diamond Rovner (no panel opinions and one dissent),
Diane P. Wood (none), Terence T. Evans (two panel opinions), and Ann
Claire Williams (one panel opinion). Judge Posner, with inestimable
influence, authored one third of all the decisions. Judge Posner's and Judge
Easterbrook's opinions combined are more than half of the IP decisions. 6
The appeals
were from the following district courts from the Seventh
7
Circuit region:
Northern Districtof Illinois: twelve
Castillo, J. (1); Grady, J. (1); Guzman, J. (1); Holderman, J. (2);
Kocoras, J. (2); Lefkow, J. (1); Norgle, J. (1); Shadur, J. (1); Zagel,
J. (1); Denlow, Mag. (1).
CentralDistrictof Illinois: one
McDade, C.J.
Southern District of Illinois: one
Gilbert, J.
Northern Districtof Indiana: two
Miller, J. (1); Sharp, J. (1).
Southern District of Indiana: three
Hamilton, J. (1); Young, J. (1); Goodich, Mag. (1).
EasternDistrict of Wisconsin: four

5. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000) (providing for eleven judges for the Seventh Circuit).
The court suffered no vacancies during the survey period. For a summary of statistics on
judicial panels and vacancies see Federal Court Management Statistics, 2002, Courts of
Appeals, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2002.pl (last visited July 31,

2003).
6. Articles, which refer to IP and underlying economic theory, written by these two
prolific judges are recommended to the reader's attention and are cited where pertinent to
individual appeals surveyed.

7. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000) provides that the Seventh Circuit is composed of Illinois,
Indiana and Wisconsin. See also 28 U.S.C. § 93 (2000) (dividing Illinois into the
Northern, Central and Southern Districts; 28 U.S.C. § 94 (2000) (dividing Indiana into the
Northern and Southern Districts; 28 U.S.C. § 130 (2000) (dividing Wisconsin into the
Eastern and Western Districts).
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Clevert, J. (1); Reynolds, J. (2); Stadtmueller, J. (1).
Western Districtof Wisconsin: four
Crabb, J. (2); Shabaz, J. (2).
The dispositions were as follows: affirmances, 18 (69%); affirmed-inpart and reversed-in-part, 3 (12%); reversed or vacated and remanded, 4
(15%); and dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, 1 (4%). One appeal was a
review of the appellate motions judge.
IP counsel representing the parties were primarily locals in the Seventh
Circuit. The firm with the most appeals reviewed herein was Kirkland &
Ellis.8 Some parties chose nationally prominent attorneys from outside the
circuit, such as Kenneth Starr9 and David Boies. 1°
To guide the reader, the first citation of every case includes the
appellate panel of judges, with the authoring judge's name italicized. The
trial judge and appellate counsel are parenthetically noted.

II. TRADEMARKS AND TRADE DRESS
A round-up of the Seventh Circuit's trademark and trade dress
decisions would include toys (Beanie BabiesTM), cars (HummerTM and
JeepTM), and toy cars (Micro MachinesTM), as well as a host of other products
and services. Ty lost both Beanie BabiesTM appeals; AM General won both
HummerTM appeals. The Seventh Circuit addressed issues of dilution and
infringement, the progressive encroachment excuse for laches, the
interpretation of licenses and dealership agreements, and insurance coverage
of trademark claims. The Seventh Circuit also considered domain names and
metatags, as well as traditional product and service marks and
configurations.
A.

Dilution

In one of two Beanie BabiesTM cases decided by the Seventh Circuit, Ty
Inc. v. Perryman,1 the Seventh Circuit concluded that using BeaniesTM in
the domain name and website of a beanbag
stuffed animal resale business did
12
not dilute Ty's BeaniesTM trademark.
Ty was the trademark owner of the Beanie BabiesTM and BeaniesTM
marks for beanbag stuffed animals.' 3 Ty sued Ruth Perryman, alleging

8. See infra notes 45-120, 176-204, 480-506, 552-590, 591-608, 636-669 and
accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 591-608 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 767-777 and accompanying text.
11. 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner,Easterbrook, Evans), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
1750 (2003). The case was appealed from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, No. 99 C 8190, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10303 (N.D. 111.
July
17, 2001) (Grady, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellee Ty, Inc., was Richard W. Young,
of Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago, IL; counsel for defendant-appellant was Joan I.
Norek, Chicago, IL.
12. Tylnc., 306F.3dat5l4.

13. Id. at 511.
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trademark infringement in her second-hand beanbag stuffed animals business
that included Internet sales. 14 Perryman used "bargainbeanies.com" as her
domain name and www.bargainbeanies.com as the website where she
advertised her stuffed animals.' 5 The district court found a violation of the
federal antidilution statute and granted summary judgment in favor of the
trademark owner Ty.' 6 The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment in part,
regarding Perryman's use of BeaniesTM in connection with reselling Ty
products, but affirmed that part of the judgment that precluded Perryman
from using the term "other BeaniesTM" ' in connection with sales of non-Ty
products. 17 The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to reformulate
8
the injunction.'
The Seventh Circuit expounded on the different theories of dilution,
expanding on its economic underpinnings, yet concluded that no theory
applied to reselling a branded product under its actual name.' 9 The courts
are concerned with "blurring," which occurs when consumer search costs
incurred in identifying a particular source of particular goods rise because "a
trademark becomes associated with a variety of unrelated products., 20 Using
TiffanyTM as an example, the Court hypothesized about an upscale restaurant
named TiffanyTM:
There is little danger that the consuming public will think it's dealing with a
branch of the Tiffany jewelry store if it patronizes this restaurant. But when
consumers next see the name "Tiffany" they may think about both the
restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy of the name as an
identifier of the store will be diminished. Consumers will have to think harder
- incur as it were21a higher imagination cost - to recognize the name as the
name of the store.
The Court described tamishment as follows:
Now suppose that the "restaurant" that adopts the name "Tiffany" is actually a
striptease joint. Again, and indeed even more certainly than in the previous
case, consumers will not think of the striptease joint under the common
ownership with the jewelry store. But because of the inveterate tendency of
the human mind to proceed by association, every time they think of the word
14. Id. at 509.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 514-15.
Id.

19. Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511-12. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70, 287
(1987) (reciting the reasons and policy considerations for protecting brand names and
noting that consumers purchase goods by relying on the trademark).
20. Ty lnc., 306 F.3d at 511.
21. Id. at 511. See also Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 875 F.2d 1026,

1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the legislative history of New York's anti-dilution statute
demonstrated that the legislation was meant to prevent such "hypothetical anomalies as
Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin tablets, Schlitz varnish, Kodak pianos, Bulova gowns, and so
forth"). But see Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (noting that the

Supreme Court has since said that mental association alone is insufficient proof of
dilution).
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"Tiffany" their image of the fancy jewelry
store will be tarnished by the
22
association of the word with the strip joint.
The Court said that tamishment was a subset of blurring because it
reduced the distinctiveness of the trademark.23 The Court suggested that
there is a third and "most far reaching concern" where, although technically
not either tarnishment or blurring,
there are still companies free-riding on the
24
trademark owner's investment.
Suppose the "Tiffany" restaurant in our first hypothetical example is located in
Kuala Lumpur and though the people who patronize it (it is upscale) have
heard of the Tiffany jewelry store, none of them is ever going to buy anything
there, so that the efficacy of the trademark as an identifier will not be impaired.
If appropriation of Tiffany's aura is nevertheless forbidden by an expansive
concept of dilution, the benefits of the jewelry store's investment in creating a
famous name will be, as economists say, "internalized" - that is, Tiffany will
realize the full benefits of the investment rather than sharing those benefits
with others - and
as a result the amount of investing in creating a prestigious
25
name will rise.
Although the Court has never articulated this third rationale for the
anti-dilution law, the Court suggested that this rationale might conceivably
track the common law doctrine of misappropriation.26 The Court questioned
the validity of this rationale as not economically feasible due to the vast
number of prestigious trademark names, which makes it unlikely that the
owner of a trademark will derive sizeable license fees.27
After canvassing the several rationales underlying dilution theory, the
Seventh Circuit said that none of them applied to Perryman's reselling of
Ty's products.2 8 Perryman was truthfully calling the beanbags toys
BeaniesTM; "You can't sell a branded product without using its brand name,
that is, its trademark. 2 9 Ty's deliberate marketing strategy, to produce a
smaller quantity of each Beanie BabyTM than the demand, gave rise to the
resale market, said the Court. 30 The Court characterization of the resale
market was as follows: "The main goal is to stampede children into nagging
their parents to buy the new Baby lest they be the only kid on the block who
doesn't have it."'31 This resale market was unlikely to operate efficiently if

22. Tylnc., 306 F.3d at 511.

23. Id.
24. Id. at 512.

25. Id. See Landes-& Posner, supra note 19, at 270 (discussing the cost of free riders
and the need for governmental protection of trademarks).
26. Tylnc., 306F.3dat512.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Court also rejected Ty's attempt to use the antidilution statute as a means
of preventing uses of the mark that, although not confusing, threaten genericide of its
BeanieTM mark. Id. at 514. According to the Court, genericide results in a social costthe trademark owner has to invest in a new trademark to identify its brand-but it also
results in a social benefit-namely, an addition to ordinary language. Id.
29. Id. at 512.
30. Id.at 512-13.
31. Id. at 513.
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sellers who specialized in serving it could not use BeaniesTM to identify their
business. 32 Forbidding Perryman to use BeaniesTM, the Court reasoned,
would be like banning a second-hand Toyota dealer from mentioning the
name in its advertising. 3
The result in this Ty case has been questioned: "I submit that there is a
big difference between saying in your advertising that you repair Chevrolets
and putting it in your business name." 34 However, the Ty case may be best
understood as tackling the question of trademark "fair use" in the context of
the relatively recent federal codification of dilution. 35 The common law
development of "reference" or "nominative" trademark fair use permits one
party to use another party's trademark as a trademark only under certain
36
conditions, such as only to the extent necessary to identify the product.
The Seventh Circuit determined that resellers are permitted to adopt
another's trademark as part of their website address and domain name, even
though consumers looking for the trademark owner may be diverted to the
reseller's website. 37 The Seventh Circuit recognized that consumers
searching for BeaniesTM could be lead to Perryman's webpage through a
non-BeanieTM- related web address, such as www.perryman.com. 38 Is it not
more likely that consumers will think BeaniesTM are connected to Ty if a
reseller's Internet company and website include BeaniesTM in its names?
Given the extended discussion on Ty's creation of the aftermarket, however,
the holding may be more limited than it appears. It may apply only to
manufacturers, such as Ty, that create the secondary market by limiting
supply.
Can Ty be squared with Equitrac? Equitrac, discussed below,
concludes that confusion likely results when a website includes a metatag
that the consumer never sees. The potential for initial interest confusion
seems more apparent in Ty, but Ty is a dilution case for which likelihood of
confusion need not exist. 39 Moreover, in Ty, Perryman's website disclaimed
any affiliation with Ty.40 In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 4 the
Supreme Court said that mental association with the trademark owner,
standing alone, was insufficient evidence of dilution, and the Court required
evidence of a lessening of a mark's capacity to identify and distinguish
goods or services.42 Where, between actual competition and mental
association, must the quantum of proof reside? Clearly, the federal

32. Tylnc., 306 F.3d at 512-13.
33. Id. at 513.
34.

Anandashankar Mazundar, ELEC. COMMERCE & L. REP., Vol. 8, No. 1l (March

19, 2003) (quoting David S. Fleming, Brinks, Hofer, Gilson & Lione, Chicago, IL).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
36.

JEROME GILSON ET AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 2-5.09[3]; §

3-11.08 [3][d].
37. Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 513.

38. Id.
39. See supra notes 11-38 and accompanying text.
40. Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511.
41. 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
42. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124-25.
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antidilution statute is still a work in progress, and IP practitioners will want
to include old standby claims like trademark infringement wherever possible.
Dilution was also at issue in AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp.,43 which involved the trade dress of front-end grille designs of JeepsTM
The Seventh Circuit held that the "family
and HummerTM H2s.
resemblance" of DaimlerChrysler's JeepTM vehicles' grilles was not enough
to be a family of marks warranting protection.44
AM General and General Motors45 brought a declaratory judgment suit,
asking the Court to find that its HummerTM H2 front-end grille neither
on its front-end
infringed nor diluted any trademark held by DaimlerChrysler
46
grilles for JeepTM sports utility vehicles (SUVs).
DaimlerChrysler then sought a preliminary injunction against GM's use
of the grille design on the new HummerTM H2 model.47 The district court
denied the motion, concluding that "DaimlerChrysler showed virtually no
chance of success on the merits" and that the balance of harms did not favor
issuing an injunction.48 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision and adopted the lower court's opinion as its own.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion also discussed the history of the car
manufacturers' front-end grille designs. Willys-Overland Motors first
manufactured jeeps during World War 11. 49 A commercial version,
developed after the war, used the same seven vertical slots in its front-end
grille. These began selling in 1945,50 and different JeepTM models "came
and went" as the ownership changed over time. Then in 1971, after other
corporate change, American Motors owned JeepTM and established two
wholly owned subsidiaries: AM General (to develop and build military and
postal vehicles) and JeepTM Corporation (to sell the JeepTM product line for
retail sale).5'
AM General developed a new military vehicle, the "M998 Series High
Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle" or HMMWV, which later become
known as the HumveeTM. 52 AM General won a government contract for the
HumveesTM in 1981.53 In 1983, LTV Corporation acquired AM General, and

43. 311 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2002) (Bauer, Coffey, Williams, JJ.). The case was
appealed from United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, No. 01CV-0134 (Miller, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellee AM General was John D. LaDue,
of Boveri, Murphy, Rice, Ryan & LaDue, South Bend, IN; the counsel for plaintiff
appellee, Christopher Landau, of Kirkland & Ellis, Washington DC and Paul R. Garcia, of
Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL; the counsel for defendant-appellant, DaimlerChrysler Corp,
was David H. Bernstein, of Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, NY.
44. AM General Corp., 311 F.3d at 802.
45. Collectively GM, except in discussion of JeepTM and AM General history.
46. Id. at 802.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. AMGeneral Corp., 311 F.3d at 806.

50. Id
51. Id.
at 807.
52. Id.

53. Id.
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established it as a wholly owned subsidiary. 4 AM General succeeded in
securing subsequent military contracts for the HumveesTM. 55 In 1999,
General Motors acquired all HummerTM brand intellectual property rights
and granted back to AM General the exclusive production rights for the new
HummerTM model and the continued right to use the HummerTM grille design
on the HumveeM. 56 GM equipped its H2 model with a narrower version of
the H 1 front-end grille.57 Meanwhile, Jeep Corporation continued to sell the
JeepTM line of vehicles. In 1987, Chrysler acquired American Motors, and
with it, Jeep Corporation. 5t
The first question the district court resolved was which JeepTM trade
dress to evaluate. DaimlerChrysler argued that its series of JeepTM grille
designs, which used seven to ten vertical slots stamped through a flat surface,
was a family of marks. 59 The Court's analysis of this argument examined (1)
distinctiveness; (2) joint use in advertising; (3) likelihood of confusion that
the junior mark will be mistakenly considered another member of the family
of marks; (4) use on closely related group of products in a particular field.6°
The Court noted that the use of a limited number of different products
weighed against finding that DaimlerChrysler had a family of marks. 6' The
Court concluded that a family of marks did not exist when the first
HummerTM vehicle was sold in 1985.62 According to the trial court, for its
dilution claim, DaimlerChrysler had to prove that the family was famous by
1985.63 The trial court noted that only one mark, the CJ-2A front-end grille
design, had fame by that date.64 The only two other JeepTM models with
front-end grille designs that fit within the family of marks as defined by
DaimlerChrysler were the 1984-85 JeepTM Cherokee and the 1985 JeepTM
Commanche truck, both sporting a grille with ten vertical slots. 65 The Court
found no evidence that the ten slot grilles had acquired fame or secondary
meaning by 1985.66
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. AMGeneral Corp., 311 F.3d at 810.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 807. A 1998 merger resulted in DaimlerChrysler. Id.
59. Id. at 812.
60. Id. at 803-04.

61. Id. at 816.
62. Id. at 818.
63. AM General Corp., 311 F3d at 813. If it is an alleged family, however, not all
members must have existed before the infringement. Id.
64. Id. at 818.

65. Id.
66. Id. The opinion explained that the court might need to evaluate the existence of

the family of marks differently for trademark dilution and trademark infringement. Id. at
819. Observing a split of authority on when to judge the strength of an asserted mark,
whether at the time an injunction is sought or at the time the junior user entered the
market, the court went with what it considered the majority view: the time of entry in the
market. Id. at 818-19. The problem with the court's analysis is its failure to determine the
relevant market. Consider that if DaimlerChrysler were to argue that confusion was not
likely until the advent of the H2 in 2002, because (1) the sales of HumveesTM to the
military were too far removed from the Jeep commercial market, and (2) the de minimis
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The Court concluded that, at the time GM's grille entered the market,
only one "member" belonged to the "family" of marks: the CJ-2A grille.
Therefore, no family of marks existed in 1985.67 The use of the ten-verticalslot design started in 1984, but had not achieved secondary meaning by
1985.68 The Court noted that two models used an eight-vertical-slot design
beginning in 1988.69 The Court found the seven-to-ten slot mark missing
from nine JeepTM models. 70 Finally, the Court evaluated two advertisements
depicting multiple JeepTM models, 71but each ad had only one model with a
grille fitting the family description.
Another sub-issue, subsumed in the family of marks issue, related to
the common parentage of AM General and DaimlerChrysler's predecessor,
JeepTM Corporation. That issue was whether LTV's acquisition of American
General transferred all intellectual property rights in the HummerTM's frontend grille design to AM General, or, conversely, was the grille design merely
licensed for use on military vehicles? If AM General was licensed and its
license was limited to military vehicles, then the Court could evaluate the
family of marks from 1992,72 when the HummerTM H1 entered the
commercial market, rather than from 1985, the time of the military vehicle's
first sale.
To answer this question, the Court looked at the agreements
accompanying the LTV acquisition of AM General.73 When LTV acquired
AM General from American Motors in 1983, it acquired intellectual property
rights for the HumveeTM, including a design patent application, which never
ripened into a patent, on the front-end design. 74 American Motors also
licensed unspecified proprietary rights, but reserved to American Motors the
JeepTM names and marks and derivatives thereof and the CJ-10 vehicle
design. 75 The trial court, interpreting the 1983 agreement pursuant to New
York law as directed in the agreement, said the plain, unambiguous language
of the contract transferred to AM General "all rights relating to the
HumveeTM design. 76 AM General could not call its vehicle a "JeepTM

sales of Hummer His beginning in 1992 were insufficient to create likely consumer
confusion, then the date at which to determine whether Jeep had developed sufficient
secondary meaning in a family of marks might have been 2002. Not all members of an
alleged family need have existed before the first commercial use of the accused mark. AM
General Corp., 311 F.3d at 819.

67. Id. at 818-19. The Court based its decision considering only those with fame or
secondary meaning by 1985.
68. Id. at 817-18.
69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Id.
at 818.
72. Arguably, the family of marks could be evaluated as of the 2002 H2 product entry
for the trademark infringement claim because arguably the likelihood of confusion did not
arise until then. Prior to that date, HumveesTM were limited to military use and Hummer
H1 sales were de minimis.
73. AMGeneral, 311 F.3d at 820.
74. Id.at 819-20.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 820. This subissue in the determination of the family of marks is the subject
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vehicle" and could not equip it with the CJ-2A design with narrow vertical
slots. 77 In order for the Court to agree with Daimler Chrysler's
interpretation, that AM General transferred its front-end grille design in the
design patent application, and yet license the design and78 maintained
ownership, it would have to "contort" the contractual language.
The Court declined to consider evidence outside the agreements,
despite DaimlerChrysler's contention that the circumstances demonstrated
the parties' intent to grant a license limited to military vehicles.79
DaimlerChrysler contended that while both AM General and Jeep
Corporation were subsidiaries of American Motors, JeepTM designers
incorporated the JeepTM grille design into the HumveeTM to give it a Jeeplike appearance. 80 The Court refused to consider testimony of one of the
negotiators of the agreements who said that he believed the HumveeM had a
JeepTM grille design, therefore falling within the reservation of JeepTM marks
and the grille design. 8' The Court said should it resort to parol evidence, it
would be more persuaded by the complete inattention to the purported
license.82 Royalties were never sought.83 Objections were not made, even
when AM General sought and obtained a trademark registration for the front
end of the HI. "This uninterrupted inattention to the 'license' speaks
deafeningly to American Motors's intent in entering into the 1983
agreements with LTV.,,8 4 Because AM General owned the front-end grille
design in the HumveeTM, the Court could
consider AM General's first use in
85
1985 for the family of marks analysis.
The district court also concluded that DaimlerChrysler had no potential
to overcome GM's affirmative defense of laches for its dilution claim.86 GM
argued that "If DaimlerChrysler had not remained silent as the grille was
used on the HumveeTM and the HI..... [GM] would not have invested
millions of dollars into the acquisition of the HummerTM brand and

of a later summary judgment granted in favor of General Motors and AM General. In AM
General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (N.D. Ind. 2003), the district
court granted summary judgment that the law of the case precluded DaimlerChrysler from
challenging the use of the H2 grille design due to the Seventh Circuit's determination on
the preliminary injunction that the agreements transferred the right to use that grille
design. As of the time of this article's printing, the Seventh Circuit had not ruled on any
appeal of that summary judgment.
77. AMGeneral, 311 F.3d at 820.
78. Id. See also AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChryslerCorp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1030
(N.D. Ind. 2003) (providing the basis for the subsequent summary judgment decision by
the trial court, which granted summary judgment for AM General and GM, based on the
law of the case on the interpretation of these agreements precluding DaimlerChrysler from
challenging the H2 grille's use).
79. AM General, 311 F.3d at 820-21.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
at 819.
Id. at 821.
Id.
Id.
Id.

85. Id.
86. AM General Corp., 311 F.3d at 822.
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development of the H2. ' ' 7 DaimlerChrysler insisted that the doctrine of
progressive encroachment88 excused its delay in filing its claims until the
advent of the H2. 89 DaimlerChrysler argued that the HumveeTM's military
use beginning in 1985 did not compete with its commercial Jeep TM sales and
that the de minimis sales of HIs excused its delay. 90
Further,
DaimlerChrysler stressed that competition was required to pose a danger of
dilution and that the doctrine of progressive encroachment applied equally to
dilution and to infringement claims. 9' General Motors contended that,
because competition was not required to prove dilution, the doctrine of
progressive encroachment never excused delay in filing a dilution case.92
The Court did not announce any general rule concerning the
applicability of the progressive encroachment doctrine to dilution claims,
although it acknowledged that the statute specifically provided that dilution
could occur without competition. 93 Instead, the Court looked at the two
elements of proof in dilution: similarity of the mark and renown.9 4 The
Court reasoned that because there was no proof that the similarity of the
grille designs or their renown had increased over time, the progressive
95
encroachment doctrine did not apply to DaimlerChrysler's dilution claim.
Although the delay in filing the dilution claim was not excused, the Court
noted that the doctrine of progressive
encroachment did apply to
96
DaimlerChrysler's infringement claim.
The likelihood of success of DaimlerChrysler's infringement claim was
decided only on the CJ-2A grille trade dress.97 The Court mentioned that
"[g]iven the length of its consistent use on JeepTM vehicles (now more than
half a century), it is easy to conclude that DaimlerChrysler has a very high
likelihood of proving that the CJ-2A grille design has acquired secondary
meaning." 98 However, the Court concluded that the likelihood of showing
likely consumer confusion was no better than negligible. 99 The Court was

87. Id.
88. See GILSON, supra note 36, at 11 .08(3)(i)(ii)(A)(IV) (defining progressive
encroachment as "plaintiff's defense against defendant's claim of laches, occurs when a
defendant begins use of a trademark or trade dress in the market, and then directs its
marketing or manufacturing efforts such that it is placed more squarely in competition
with the plaintiff").
89. AMGeneral, 311 F.3d at 823.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 823-24.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. AM General Corp., 311 F.3d at 824.
97. Id. The court's insistence on the 1985 date is at odds with its determination that
the doctrine of progressive encroachment applied to this claim. The findings underpinning
the progressive encroachment determination would also support a conclusion that
confusion was not likely until the introduction of the H1 or H2, which would permit
consideration of the infringement of later-introduced front-end grille designs.
98. AM General,311 F.3d at 824.

99. Id.
at 825-26.
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unpersuaded that survey evidence demonstrated likely confusion. 00° The
Court discounted two surveys, in which respondents were shown pictures of
the front end of a HummerTM H2, to the extent that they demonstrated an
association between the pictured vehicle and "JeepTM '' generally or to models
other than those with the CJ-2A grille.' 0' Having discounted most of the
associations with JeepTM, the Court said that the remaining associations were
too few (2.2%) to support the proposition that the H2 grille was sufficiently
02
similar to the JeepTM CJ-2A grille to make consumer confusion likely.
Looking at the classic likelihood of confusion factors, the Court
concluded that only one factor, the strength of General Motor's CJ-2A grille
design, weighed in favor of concluding confusion was likely. 0 3 On the
similarity of the trade dresses, the Court found only modest similarity: "[t]he
CJ-2A grille is a series of seven long, narrow, closely bunched slots; the
intended H2 grille is a series of seven shorter, wider, and more widely
spaced slots.' 1 4 The Court did not analyze the variations in the CJ-2A
grilles amongst the many models it was used on, most recently the JeepTM
Wrangler and the JeepTM Liberty. The Court also did not evaluate the
change in the HummerTM grilles from the wider HI to the narrower H2. The
Court scrupulously avoided considering the front-end grilles in the context of
the remainder of the vehicles they were used upon, and did not consider
whether the front-end grilles considered, whatever their differences, might
have more similarities than the front-end grilles of other vehicles. On the
manner and area of concurrent use, the Court said that vehicles of both frontend grilles would
be sold at car dealerships, but these would be different
05
dealerships.
Regarding the degree of care likely to be used by consumers, the Court
noted that vehicle consumers, spending more than $16,000 on a JeepTM
vehicle or more than $50,000 on an H2, were likely to use a great deal of
care.' 0 6 At the time of the decision, the H2 had not yet been sold, so the
evidence of actual confusion could not reasonably be expected. 0 7 On the
issue of General Motors's intent to pass off the H2 as a DaimlerChrysler
JeepTM vehicle, the Court concluded there was no direct evidence to support
that claim. 0 8 The Court rejected DaimlerChrysler's argument that General
Motor's advertising references to a "legend" referred to JeepTM vehicles
rather than other HummerTM vehicles and their use in Operation Desert
Shield. 09
The Court noted that because DaimlerChrysler had shown no likelihood
of confusion, the Court need not consider the harm to deny the preliminary
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 827-29.

104. Id. at 825.
105. AM GeneralCorp., 311 F.3d at 827.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 828.
ld. at829.
Id.
Id.

2003]

Intellectual PropertyLaw in the Seventh Circuit: 2002

injunction motion. 110 However, the Court did consider the harm to the
parties and others and concluded that on balance they "weigh[ed]
enormously against the requested injunction." '' The Court determined this,
despite its view that over fifty years of goodwill built up around a
"venerable" brand identifier would be irreparably harmed if the injunction
was not issued, and the infringement was proven after the introduction of the
H2.1" 2 The Court also noted that the confusion may cause potential job
losses to DaimlerChrysler employees and harm consumers. 1 3 The harm to
General Motors, the Court acknowledged, was largely due to its own highstakes decisions during the suit's pendency.' 4 However, the Court was
sensitive to the $700 million General Motors invested in the H2 project. 115
The Court was persuaded that there would be considerable harm to Indiana
residents and state and local governments who made extraordinary
arrangements to facilitate building the H2 production plant (including buying
homes located where the plant was later built)." 6
Despite the Seventh Circuit's contrary view, the DaimlerChrysler
decision seems to deliver overly broad and unnecessary dicta, which will
likely be cited for a rash of purposes. The real message of this decision
appears to be that JeepTM, and its many associated corporate entities, missed
the moment. If indeed it gave its sister corporation limited permission to use
a JeepTM grille design, but did not intend that use to expand beyond the
military use, then it should have been on notice to carefully protect its
reserved rights. JeepTM should have been the most scrupulous at the time of
the LTV agreement. If JeepTM intended to grant the license only for military
vehicles, then it could have included an express reservation clarifying that
point. It took a risk in failing to do so. Perhaps JeepTM did not wish an
express reservation for fear that it would be a deal-buster.
B. Likely Confusion
A court may grant a preliminary injunction against a business with a
website using metatags 117 that cause initial interest confusion, according to

110. Id. at 830.
111. Id.
at 835.
112. AM General Corp., 311 F.3d at 831-32.
113. Id. at 832.

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 832-33.
117. The court described metatags as follows:
Metatags are HTML [HyperText Markup Language] code intended to describe the

contents of the web site.

There are different types of metatags, but those of

principal concern to us are the "description" and "keyword" metatags.

The

description metatags are intended to describe the web site; the keyword metatags, at
least in theory, contain keywords relating to the contents of the web site. The more
often a term appears in the metatags and in the text of the web page, the more likely
it is that the web page will be "hit" in a search for that keyword and the higher on
the list of "hits" the web page will appear.
PromatekIndus. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 811 n.1. (7th Cir. 2002).
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the Seventh Circuit in Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp.118 The

appeal in Promatek was from a preliminary injunction that required the
defendant,
Equitrac, to place the following remedial language on its web
9
1
page:
If you were directed to this site through the term "Copitrack," that is in error as
there is no affiliation between Equitrac and that term. The mark "Copitrak" is
a registered trademark of Promatek Industries,
Ltd., which can be found at
20
www.promatek.com or www.copitrak.com. 1
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction grant. 121
The Equitrac website had been constructed using CopitrackT as a
metatag. The use of "CopitrackTM'' was the webmaster's unintentional
misspelling of"Copitrak."'' 22 Equitrac and Promatek were competitors in the
cost-recovery and cost-control equipment business.' 23 Promatek sold
COPITRAK equipment, which provided a means of accounting and billing
for the number of paper copies made for clients of law firms, accounting
firms and such. 124 Even though Equitrac sold a competing device, Equitrac
contended that it included the CopitrackTM metatag on its website
as a means
25
of advertising its capability to service Copitrak equipment.'
Upon learning of Equitrac's use of the CopitrackTM metatag, Promatek
sued for trademark infringement.' 26 Equitrac thereafter contacted all known
search engines to have any link from the business' website to the term
CopitrackTM removed.127 Equitrac removed the problematic metatag from its
website.1 28 Nevertheless, Promatek sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent the use of CopitrackTM on Equitrac's website.129 After granting the
motion, the district court required that Equitrac post the above notice of
nonaffiliation.130 Equitrac appealed.
The Seventh Circuit considered the following factors required for a
preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
118. 300 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, Kanne, Williams, JJ.), reh 'g and reh 'g
en banc denied, No. 00-4376, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 22217 (7th Cir. Oct. 18, 2002). The
case was appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division, No. 00 C 4999 (Shadur, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellee
and trademark owner Promatek Industries, was James K. Borcia, of Tressler, Soderstrom,
Maloney & Priess, Chicago, IL; the counsel for defendant-appellant Equitrac Corp., was
George N. Vurdelja. See William F. Lang IV, Hidden Liability within Hidden Text:
Internet Metatags, 5 LAWS J. 8 (2003) (discussing guidelines for metatag use).
119. The remedial language does not appear on www.equitrac.com as of the time of this
article's publication (last visited September 8, 2003).
120. Promatek, 300 F.3d at 810.

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 810, 812.
Id. at 812.
Id.

125. Id. at 810.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Promatek,300

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

F.3d at 811.
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inadequacy of a legal remedy in the absence of the injunction and irreparable
harm; (3) the balancing of harms; and (4) the public interest. 3 On the
likelihood of success, the Seventh Circuit considered the traditional
likelihood of confusion factors132 used to assess trademark infringement:
First, in considering "the similarity between the marks," the Court
found the marks were similar because Equitrac confessed that it intended to
use the proper spelling of Copitrak in its metatag. 33 Second, in considering
"the similarity of the products," the Court concluded that the cost-recovery
and cost-control equipment and services were in direct competition with
each other. 134 Third, in evaluating "the area and manner of concurrent use of
the products," the Court concluded there was direct competition.135 Fourth,
in analyzing "the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers," the
factor most discussed, 136 the Court found that Internet consumers could
initially be confused. 137 Fifth, in considering "the strength of the plaintiffs
marks," no evidence was provided.138 Likewise, in considering "evidence of
actual confusion," no evidence was provided. 39 Finally, in evaluating "the
defendant's intent to palm off its goods as those of the plaintiffs," the
Seventh Circuit discounted the defendant's claims that it did not intend to
mislead customers. The Court noted that Equitrac "used that trademark in a
way calculated
to deceive consumers into thinking that Equitrac was
4°
Promatek."'
The Seventh Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit in ruling that placing a
competitor's trademark in a metatag created a likelihood of confusion
because of initial interest confusion.' 41 Initial interest confusion, under the
Lanham Act "occurs when a customer is lured to a product by the similarity
of the mark, even if the customer realizes the true source of the goods before
the sale is consummated.' 42 The Seventh Circuit found compelling the
rationale in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
43
Corp.:1

In Brookfield Communications, the court found that although
consumers are not confused when they reach a competitor's website, there is

131. Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.at812.
Promatek,300 F.3d at 812.
Id.
Id.

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Promatek, 300 F.3d at 813.
141. Id. at 812. See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834,
845-46 (S.D. Ind. 2000), affd 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000) (using PROZAC mark in
metatags of defendant's website advertising HEBROZAC for its herbal alternative created
initial interest confusion). Cf Playboy Enter. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal.
1999), aff'd 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting use of PLAYBOY and PLAYMATE
OF THE YEAR in defendant's website).
142. Promatek, 300 F.3d at 812.
143.

174 F.3d 1036, 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999).
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nevertheless initial interest confusion. This is true in this case, because by
Equitrac's placing the term Copitrack in its metatag, consumers are diverted
to its website and Equitrac reaps the goodwill Promatek developed in the
Copitrak mark. As the court in Brookfield explained,
"[U]sing another's trademark in one's metatags is much like posting a sign
with another's trademark in front of one's store." Customers believing they
are entering the first store rather than the second are still likely to mill around
before they leave. The same theory is true for websites. Consumers who are
directed to Equitrac's webpage are likely to learn more about Equitrac
44 and its
products before beginning a new search for Promatek and Copitrak.1
The Court did not consider the brevity of the potential confusion to be
important. 145 The Court found that trademark infringement is not excused by
the fact that consumers' confusion would eventually be disspelled. 46 The
Seventh Circuit's main concern was the misappropriation of a company's
goodwill by another, and in that sense, "Equitrac cannot unring the bell.' 47
Regarding the second element required for a preliminary injunction, the
Court said that Promatek's injury to its consumer goodwill was an
irreparable harm for which Promatek had no adequate remedy at law.' 48 On
the balance of harms, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that,
without the injunction, Equitrac would continue to attract Internet consumers
by using Promatek's trademark, thereby capitalizing on Promatek's
goodwill. 149 The Court rejected Equitrac's argument that Promatek was not
being harmed because its consumers were sophisticated business people who
were not likely to be confused easily or to make a purchase on the website. 50
It ruled that the public interest was served by preventing consumer
confusion.151
Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected Equitrac's argument that the
district court committed a procedural error in refusing to hold an evidentiary
hearing. 152 Equitrac claimed that it would have introduced evidence on its
entitlement to advertise its capability of repairing CopitrackTM products.' 53
The Seventh Circuit said the failure to hear evidence on this point was no
error because it was not the offer of repair services on the website which was
problematic, but the way consumers found their way to Equitrac's website,
that in effect the CopitrackTM metatag led consumers into thinking that
Equitrac was Promatek. 14
What is perhaps most interesting about the injunction against Equitrac

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

151.
152.
153.
154.

Promatek,300 F.3d at 812-13 (citations omitted).
Id. at 812.
Id. at 812-13.
Id. at 813.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Promatek, 300 F.3d at 814.
Id.
Id
Id.
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was the remedial language for the website. If the initial interest confusion
resulted from website searches of CopitrackTM or Copitrak, then the remedial
language potentially perpetuated the problem. If potential customers
searched for Copitrak, they would still get to Equitrac due to the "remedial"
language. Perhaps this is the reason that the remedial language is not
presently on Equitrac's website.
Another case addressed likelihood of confusion for online consumers,
albeit in dicta. In Simon Property Group v. mySimon, Inc., the Simon
Property Group (SPG), a real estate investment group with the domain name
simon.com alleged Lanham Act and state law violations through the use of
the mySimon domain name, web address and cartoon mascot in its
comparison Internet shopping business. 155 The district court granted a
permanent injunction, following a jury trial, but stayed the injunction
pending resolution of some outstanding damages issues. 5 6 The Seventh
Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but put in its two cents
on the evidence of likelihood of confusion. 157
The Seventh Circuit said that it had jurisdiction of an appeal
challenging a delay in issuing an injunction if it was, effectively, a denial of
injunctive relief that was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).158 However,
the party attempting to appeal must show that the district court's decision
was a definitive disposition of the request for relief and that a delay would
cause irreparable harm. 59 The Seventh Circuit said that SPG demonstrated
neither. 60 First, SPG voluntarily abandoned its request for a preliminary
injunction after the district court denied its TRO motion.' 6'
Such
abandonment strongly undermined SPG's argument that the permanent
injunction delay would cause irreparable harm.' 62 The Seventh Circuit also
rejected SPG's argument that the trademark infringement would result in an
irreparable harm due to the inability to control the nature and quality of the
infringer's services.' 63 The Seventh Circuit called this irreparable harm
argument "thin." The Court believed mySimon's evidence on likelihood of
confusion was stronger than SPG's evidence:

155. 282 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2002) (Flaum, C.J., Bauer, Evans, JJ.) The case was
appealed from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, No. IP
99-1195-C H/G 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 852 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 24, 2001) (Hamilton, J.). The
counsel for plaintiff-appellant was Daniel L. Boots, of Bingham, Summers, Welsh &
Spilman, Indianapolis, IN and David C. Hilliard, of Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury,
Hilliard & Geraldson, Chicago, IL; the counsel for defendant-appellee, was Richard A.
User, of Locke Reynolds, Indianapolis, IN and Costantine L. Trela, of Sidley Austin
Brown & Wood, Chicago, IL).
156. Simon Property Group, 282 F.3d at 989. The district court set aside the $11.5
million award for profits, reduced the $10 million in state law punitive damages, and
ordered a new trial on the corrective advertising issue. Id.
157. Id. at 991.

158. Id. at 990.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 990-91.
Id.at 990.
Simon Property Group, 282 F.3d at 990.
Id. at990-91.
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Despite the relative strength of mySimon's evidence and the relative weakness
of SPG's, SPG's lawyer must have done a whale of a selling job as the jury
awarded the company $11.5 million in mySimon's "profits" (although
mySimon had not yet earned any profits), $5.3 million in corrective advertising
(although SPG had not engaged64in any corrective advertising), and $10 million
in state law punitive damages. 1
165
The Court noted that SPG and mySimon offered dissimilar services,
and that mySimon's survey
evidence indicated that a "negligible risk of
66
confusion" was present.'
The Seventh Circuit discredited SPG's surveys because they questioned
professionals whose jobs required them to be aware of SPG, and thus were
unrepresentative of the typical consumer.' 67 MySimon's four surveys, on the
other hand, questioned Internet users and shopping mall consumers. 68 Two
percent of the respondents indicated relevant confusion. 169 The Seventh
Circuit considered this "substantial" evidence of no likely confusion. 170
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion on SPG's lack of credibility of the
evidence appears insufficiently deferential to the jury. This case confirms
what is well-understood by trademark trial attorneys: courts can almost
always find something wrong with a survey.
The Te-Ta-Ma Truth Foundation v. World Church of the Creatorcase
serves as a grave reminder to all officers of the court, both judges and
attorneys, that the public service component of their duties may involve
personal danger.i 71 In 1982, the white supremacist group involved in Te-TaMa, called itself Church of the CreatorTM. In 1996, it changed its name to
World Church of the Creator.
Te-Ta-Ma gained renown when World Church's leader Matt Hale was
the subject of a contempt hearing for refusing to stop using an infringing
mark and turn over its organization's material bearing the mark. i 72 The case
then took a harrowing turn: Hale was arrested for allegedly conspiring to kill

164. Id. at 989.
165. Id. at 991.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 988-89.
168. Id. at 989.
169. Simon Property Group, 282 F.3d at 988-89. (citations omitted).
170. Id.
171. 297 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2002) (Coffey, Easterbrook,Williams, JJ.), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 864 (2003). The case was appealed from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, No. 00 C 2638, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1478 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 31, 2002) (Lefkow, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant Te-Ta-Ma Truth
Foundation-Family of URI, Inc., was Paul R. Steadman, of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL;
the counsel for defendant-appellee, The World Church of the Creator, was Todd M.
Reardon, of A Citizen's Law Office, Charleston, IL.
172. See also Shia Kapos, Hale Church Finedfor Trademark; U.S. Judge Sets Penalty
Until it Stops Using Name, CHI. TRIB., April 25, 2003, at B3 (noting that the World
Church, now calling itself the Creativity Movement, was fined $1000 per day for each day
it failed to comply with the injunction forbidding its use of the CHURCH OF THE
CREATOR and requiring it to shut down its website and to surrender its membership list).
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73
the federal district judge in the Te-Ta-Ma case.'
The Te-Ta-Ma Seventh Circuit decision focused on a single question,
"Is Church of the CreatorTM generic?' 74 The Seventh Circuit concluded it
was descriptive, not generic,
and therefore the mark could be enforced
75
against the World Church. 1
Te-Ta-Ma began receiving protests about its supposedly racist creed, a
clear sign of confusion between the groups.' 76 Te-Ta-Ma brought suit
seeking an injunction against the World Church's use of its name. 177 Both
sides moved for summary judgment, and the district court entered judgment
in favor of defendant, on the grounds that Church of the CreatorTM was 78
a
religions and was therefore unenforceable.
generic name of monotheistic 79
The Seventh Circuit reversed. 1
According to the Seventh Circuit, the fact that the mark was
incontestable only amounted to a rebuttal presumption of non-genericness
and did not preclude a finding that the mark was generic. 80 The Court
looked to the mark's usage: "A mark is 'generic' when it has become the
name of a product (e.g., 'sandwich' for meat between slices of bread) or
class of products (thus 'church' is generic). But 'Church of the Creator' is
descriptive, like 'lite beer.' It does not name the class of monotheistic
religions."''8
The Seventh Circuit recited numerous "Church of' designations for
denominations of religions.' 82 The Court distinguished a denominational
name from a religious designation:

No Jewish, Islamic, Baha'i, or Unitarian group would say that it belongs to a
"Church of the Creator;" and a Christian congregation would classify itself
first into its denomination (e.g., Baptist, Lutheran, Russian Orthodox, Society
173. See Te-Ta-Ma Truth Found v. World Church of the Creator,246 F. Supp. 2d 980
(N.D. I11. 2003) (dismissing Hale's motion to disqualify the judge); Te-Ta-Ma Truth
Found v. World Church of the Creator,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5466 (N.D. Ill. March 31,
2003) (noting that even though the opposing counsel received threatening communications
from Hale, this still was not an exceptional case as to justify awarding attorney fees to
counsel). As of the date of this article, his criminal trial is pending. The World Church's
litigation tactics include refusing to comply with the court's injunction prohibiting World
Church's use of Church of the Creator,TM seeking disqualification of the threatened judge,
and filing suit against Te-Ta-Ma, which was dismissed on grounds of res judicata in view
of the litigation discussed herein.
174. Te-Ta-Ma, 297 F.3d at 665.
175. Id. at 666.
176. Id.
177. Te-Ta-Ma, 297 F.3d at 664.
178. Id. at 665.

179. Id. at 667.
180. Id. at 665.

The Seventh Circuit was not persuaded that only the Patent and

Trademark Office, and not courts, could cancel a generic mark. Id
181. Id. at 666.
182. Id. The court lists "Church of God; Church of God (Anderson, Indiana); First
Church of God; Worldwide Church of God; Church of God in Christ; Assembly of God;
Korean Assembly of God; Church of the Nazarene; Church of Christ; United Church of
Christ; Disciples of Christ; Church of Christ, Scientist; Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints." Te-Ta-Ma, 297 F.3d at 666.
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of Friends), then into one of the major groupings (Roman Catholic, Orthodox,
and Protestant), and finally into Christianity, but never into a "Church of the
Creator." No one called or emailed a Baptist church to complain about its
complicity in the hate mongering of the World Church of the Creator; people
recognized the name as denominational,
and that's why protest ended up in the
83
Church of the Creator's in box.'
The Seventh Circuit said that using Church of the CreatorTM as a
denominational name left ample choices for other sects to establish a
separate identity.' 84 The Court noted that where the question of generic
versus descriptive was close, it was helpful to ask whether one firm's
exclusive use of the phrase would prevent rivals from naming themselves
and describing their products. 185 The Seventh Circuit rejected World
Church's evidence of dictionary definitions of the individual words,
"church" and "creator:" "That won't cut the mustard, because dictionaries
reveal a range of historical meanings rather than how people use a particular
phrase in contemporary culture. ([S]imilarly, looking up the words 'cut' and
86
'mustard' would not reveal the meaning of the phrase we just used)."'
The Seventh Circuit rejected the World Church's argument that, as a
religious group, it was exempt from trademark laws by the First
Amendment. 187 The Seventh Circuit also rejected World Church's argument
that it was the prior user because of its earlier use of the mark: "It turns out
that tactics adopted to avoid paying for one's wrongs have collateral
88
costs." 1

The Seventh Circuit's distinction between a mark's designation of
denomination, rather than a monotheistic religion, seems to make no
meaningful difference in terms of deciding whether the mark was generic.
Certainly, the genericness doctrine gets to the public policy issue of language
necessity, and the Seventh Circuit was right in assuring itself that the public
did not need "World Church" as the only means of describing a service.
However, the question might have been better decided on grounds other than
religious classification, such as World Church's failure to meet its burden of
proof. The Foundation had an incontestable mark; therefore, the World
Church was required to prove it was generic. Its only evidence was
dictionary definitions of individual words.' 89 The Court could have avoided
the difficult task of distinguishing religious classifications by pointing to the
World Church's lack of evidence.
C. Licensing and Franchising
The Seventh Circuit had a second occasion to consider the very visible
HummerT

trademarks last year. The scope of a representation agreement

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 666-67.

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.at 666.
Id.at 667.
Id.
Id.at 666.
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for a third party to license the HummerT mark was the subject of the appeal
in Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM General Corp.190 The trial court dismissed,
for failure to state a claim, the breach of contract allegation made by
19
Beanstalk, the HummerTM trademark licensing representative.
'
The
192
Rovner.
Judge
from
dissent
a
with
affirmed,
Seventh Circuit
Beanstalk's was in the intellectual property license negotiations
business. 193 It entered into an agreement with AM General, in 1997, to
obtain licenses to use AM General's HummerTM mark in exchange for thirtyfive percent of the receipts from those licenses.1 94 The representation
agreement gave the following definition of property: "'Property' shall mean
the name, symbols, designs, logos, packaging, copyrights and trademarks of
HummerTM, and such other trade names, trademarks, copyrights, logos and
other ancillary rights relating thereto to the195fullest extent that Owner has, or
may hereafter obtain, title or right thereto."'
The nature of the representation and the license agreements covered
were defined as follows:
(b) The term "License Agreement" as used in this Agreement shall be deemed
to include any agreement or arrangement, whether in the form of a license or
otherwise, granting merchandising or other rights in the Property.
2. NATURE OF REPRESENTATION. Owner hereby engages Beanstalk, and
Beanstalk accepts such engagement, to act as its sole and exclusive nonemployee representative.. .(i) for the purpose of conceiving and establishing
licensing programs in the Property,(ii) to seek out persons, firms or
corporations to enter into License Agreements for use of the Property, and(iii)
to solicit and negotiate agreements on the Owner's behalf with any person,
firm or corporation in the Territory granting licenses to use the property and

all trademarks, trade names, service marks, copyrights... in connection with
the manufacture, distribution, sale, advertising and promotion of any and all

190. 283 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner,Rovner, Evans, JJ.),
reh'g and reh'g en
banc denied, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7679 (7th Cir. Apr. 24, 2002). The case was
appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, No. 00
C 525 (Sharp, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant Beanstalk Group, Inc. was Marc S.
Dreier, of Dreier & Baritz, New York, NY; the counsel for co-defendants-appellees and
trademark owners AM General Corp. was Mark D. Boveri and Patrick D. Murphy, of
Boveri, Murphy, Rice, Ryan & LaDue, South Bend, IN and co-defendants-appellees
General Motors Corp., Victoria L Nilles, Barnes & Thomburg, South Bend, IN)). For
suggestions on avoiding the Beanstalk problem, see GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES
W. GRIMES, THE LAW OF MERCHANDISING AND CHARACTER LICENSING § 6:17 (2002).
191. Beanstalk Group, 283 F.3d at 858. Claims of tortious interference with contract
and unjust enrichment were also dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id.at 863-64. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court on those counts as well, noting that GM did not
procure a breach of the representation agreement and that Beanstalk had been paid for past
licenses and was not due any prospective license payments even for renewals because GM,
as the new owner of the HUMMER trademark, was entitled to veto these. Id.at 863-64.
192. Id.at 864.
193. Id. at 858.
194. Id.
195. Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM General Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1022 (N.D.
Ind. 2001).
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articles of merchandise or commerce, services, endorsements or any other form
licensed. 196
of exploitation of the business of the person, firm or corporation so
The representation agreement was assignable, but by Beanstalk only,
and only with AM's consent. 197 Beanstalk negotiated approximately twentyfour License Agreements on AM General's behalf' 198 In 1999, AM General
entered into a joint-venture agreement with General Motors under which GM
would (1) design and engineer a new HummerTM model; (2) loan AM
General $235 million to build a new factory; (3) buy a minimum number of
the new HummersTM; (4) obtain an option on 40% of AM General's common
199
stock; and (5) acquire the HUMMERTM trademark.
GM informed Beanstalk that it would not compensate Beanstalk for
any license agreements after the joint venture became effective because it
had not assumed any of AM General's obligations under the representation
agreement. 20 0 Beanstalk filed a diversity breach of contract action, claiming
that it was due thirty-five percent of the consideration running from GM to
AM General that was attributable to the trademark transfer. 20 1 The district
court dismissed the breach of contract claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 20 2 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed.20 3
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the joint venture agreement was not
an agreement contemplated in the broad language defining license
agreements for which Beanstalk was due compensation. 204 The Court
explained that there were two bases for ignoring the contract's language.
interpretation and, the other, an interpretation of the
One was a "cultural"
20 5
contract as a whole.
First, the Court could ignore the plain language where that
interpretation yielded "absurd" results viewed in "cultural" context. 20 6 The
Court viewed the joint venture agreement as a sale of the HummerTM
business and not the merchandising covered by the representation
agreement. 2 07 The joint venture was in essence'a transfer of the HummerTM
where AM General's role was decreased only to
business to GM,
20 8
manufacturing.
According to the Court, Beanstalk was not a business broker. 20 9 The
Court hypothesized that the parties could hardly have intended to give a

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

id. at 1022-23 (emphasis added).
Beanstalk Group, 283 F.3d at 858.
Beanstalk, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.
Beanstalk Group, 283 F.3d at 859.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 860-61.
Id. at 860-62.
Beanstalk Group, 283 F.3d at 859-60.
Id. at 860-61.
Id.
Id. at861.
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merchandiser a commission from the sale of the HummerTM business. 2 1° To
illustrate the absurdity of Beanstalk's interpretation, the Court noted that if
AM General sold its HummerTM business the day following the signing of
the representation agreement, Beanstalk would have been due thirty-five
percent of the value of the trademark transfer without having contributed
anything to that value. 211 The Court, however, said it might rely on
"cultural" as well as linguistic interpretations:
The cultural background that a judge brings to the decision of a contract case
includes as we said a general knowledge of how the world operates, including
the commercial world, and this knowledge, precisely because it is general
rather than being knowledge of the specific facts of the case ("adjudicative
facts"), can show that the literal interpretation of a particular212
contractual term
would be unsound, in which event no evidence need be taken.
The Court explained its cultural understanding of absurdity as an
interpretive principle and not a species of paternalism:
To interpret a contract... [o]ne must know something about the practical as
well as the purely verbal context of the language to be interpreted. In the case
of a commercial contract, one must have a general acquaintance with
commercial practices. This doesn't mean that jud es should have an M.B.A.
or have practiced corporate or commercial law...
According to the Court, it is sufficient that the judge be an alert citizen
of a market-oriented society, so that she can recognize business absurdity
when she sees it. 214 215
The Court was weary of stiff literalism that could lead to
nonsensical results.

Turning from the cultural interpretation to interpreting the contract as a
whole, the Court said that Beanstalk's asserted interpretation ignored that the
representation agreement engaged Beanstalk to be AM General's "sole and
exclusive non-employee representative. '' 2 16 This implied, according to the
Court, that AM General's employees could negotiate license agreements
without going through Beanstalk.21 7 Beanstalk conceded this, but argued
that, for agreements negotiated by AM General regarding the HummerTM
trademark, receipts still had to be paid to Beanstalk.2 18
The Seventh Circuit said that Beanstalk's interpretation would ignore
the agreement provisions that required license receipts "on Owner's behalf'
to be accounted to AM General periodically. 219 The Court said that this
implied that Beanstalk would receive receipts only for license agreements
that it negotiated, an interpretation reinforced by the failure to include in the
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id.
Beanstalk Group, 283 F.3d at 862.
Id.at 860.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 862 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Beanstalk Group, 283 F.3d at 862.
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agreement any method of compensating Beanstalk out of receipts received
directly by AM General. 220 The Court considered "absurd" Beanstalk's
argument that Beanstalk rather than AM General should have been paid for
the HummerTM business sale in the first instance.22 '
The Court did not allow Beanstalk to present evidence on its
interpretation of the agreement. 22 The only evidence that Beanstalk wanted
to present was AM General's request for an express exclusion from the
representation agreement of any agreement "for the purpose of producing
motor vehicles." 223 The Court's response was stated plainly: But of course.
It was simple prudence for AM General to try to head off this lawsuit. It
doesn't follow that the lawsuit has any merit. Indeed, to penalize AM
General for attempting an amicable resolution of a potential dispute in
advance would violate the spirit of the rule that makes settlement offers
inadmissible in an adjudication on the merits.224
In her dissent, Judge Rovner voiced her concern that the Court avoid
the temptation, heightened by an overburdened docket, to weed out weak
claims by "bending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure past the breaking
point., 22 5 Judge Rovner's dissent made a reference to the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Jackson v. Marion County,226 where the court noted a growing
tendency to expand the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to dispose
of cases on summary judgment where previously they would have gone to
trial. 227 "We drew the line in Jackson [sic]," said Judge Rovner, "to make
clear that we will not interpolate a requirement of fact pleading into the
federal rules. 228
The dissent also questioned the appropriateness of substituting the
Court's "cultural understanding" for a defined term in the contract:
[l]n the absence of discovery, the majority substitutes its own "cultural
understanding," its own "cultural background," and its own general knowledge
of the commercial world for a defined term in the contract, a dubious
proposition at best. Judges are trained in law, not business, and however
cosmopolitan we may be about the world of commerce, I think it an unwise
practice to substitute our general knowledge of the business world for the
express terms of a contract, especially2 in the absence of any discovery that
might elucidate the parties' true intent. 29
The dissent observed that most cases resolving a contract interpretation
by eliminating those yielding "absurd" results were finalized later in the
litigation stage than in the instant case, either in a summary judgment ruling
220. Id.
221. Id.

222. Id at 863.
223. Id.

224. Id.
225.

Id. at 866.

See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE

AND REFORM 53-86 (1996) (discussing the increased workload of federal courts).
226. 66 F.3d 151, 153 (7th Cir. 1995).
227. Beanstalk Group, 283 F.3d at 866.

228. Id.
229. Id.at 865-66.
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or after trial. ° Judge Rovner reasoned that, rather than calling Beanstalk's
interpretation absurd, the contract might simply be a bad deal, from which
AM General did not need protection, as if an unsophisticated party. 231 The
majority's suggestion that AM General could not have intended to pay
"double" for licenses negotiated by its own employees by having to pay its
employees salaries and a portion of the license fees to Beanstalk, was not
proper on the 12(b)(6) motion without discovery on the parties intent, the
dissent argued.232 A line should be drawn in this case "to require discovery
on the intentions of the contracting parties rather than233substituting our own
cultural understanding for ambiguous contract terms."
Judge Rovner agreed with the majority that other provisions in the
representation agreement gave some reason to question the plain language of
the definition of "License Agreement:" "Although there is a tension between
the definition of License Agreement and other provisions of the contract, it is
not for us to resolve that tension on a motion to dismiss." 234 In short, the
dissent viewed further discovery rather than dismissal as the proper course.
The importance of this case is likely to grow over time, impacting more than
intellectual property.
In Beanstalk, the Court used its "business sense" to disregard the plain
language of a contract when reviewing a motion to dismiss.235 When
Beanstalk stood on the literal terms of the representation agreement, the
majority said it stood on "quicksand., 236 The case is already being cited to
support the "business sense" means of interpreting contracts. For example,
in Gerow v. Rohm & Haas Co., 23 7 the Court cites Beanstalk and notes: "it is

a fundamental principle of contract interpretation that courts read language to
make business sense whenever possible." 238 Rovner's dissent is compelling;
why not let the record develop and perhaps demonstrate a more appropriate
ground for disregarding the agreement's plain language?
In another decision provoking a dissent, Dersch Energies, Inc. v. Shell
Oil Co., 239 the Court addressed the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act

(PMPA),24 ° the first of two cases in which the Seventh Circuit looked at

230. Id.
231. Id. at 865.
232. Id. at 866.

233. Id.
234. Beanstalk Group, 283 F.3d at 866.

235. Id. at 865-66.
236. Id.at 863.
237. 308 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2002).
238. Gerow, 308 F.3d at 725.
239. 314 F.3d 846 (7th Cir. 2002) (Flaum, C.J., Cudahy, Manion, JJ.). The case was
appealed from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22381 (S.D. I11.
May 15, 2001) (Gilbert, J.). The counsel for plaintiffappellant Dersch Energies, Inc., was William L. Taylor, of Taylor & Powell, Alexandria,
VA; the counsel for defendant-appellee Shell Oil Co. and Equilon Enterprises, was
William J. Becker, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Edwardsville, IL and Douglas C.
Crone, of Tribler, Orpett & Crone, Chicago, IL).
240. 15 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[36:857

allegations invoking that statute.24 ' Both cases were decided in favor of the
franchisors. The PMPA is a federal statute for the protection of franchised
dealers and distributors, of gasoline and other petroleum products, who have
invested in the franchisor's trademarks, thus creating goodwill that the
242
franchisor might be tempted to appropriate by terminating the franchisee.
Thus, the Act is intended to limit the franchisor's right to terminate its
franchise agreements.243
At issue in the case was Shell Oil's agreement with Dersch to sell Shell
Oil products for resale to retail distributors.244 With their franchise
agreement set to expire in fall of 1998, the parties began negotiating a
renewal in December 1997.245 After ten months of negotiating and with
Dersch having voiced concern over a number of provisions, Dersch signed
the renewal agreement "under protest., 246 Dersch operated under the
Renewal Agreement for a year, and then filed suit pursuant to the PMPA
seeking a declaration that Shell Oil and Equilon (collectively "Equilon") had
violated the PMPA by conditioning the renewal of its franchise agreement on
Dersch's releasing claims and rights it allegedly held under federal and state
law.247 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants because it found that Dersch failed to prove as a threshold matter
that its franchise was terminated or nonrenewed, as required by 15 U.S.C.
§ 2805(c) or that the franchise was "constructively" nonrenewed. 248 The
district court rejected Dersch's argument that the PMPA's § 2805(f), which
prohibited the conditioning a franchise renewal on the franchisee's releasing
or waiving its rights under federal or state law, provided an independent
basis for relief upon demonstrating constructive nonrenewal. 249 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed.25 °
The Court provided an overview of the PMPA: "The PMPA governs
franchise arrangements for the sale, consignment or distribution of motor
fuel 'in commerce,' and protects franchisees from arbitrary or discriminatory
termination or nonrenewal of their motor fuel franchises. 25' The Court
noted that Congress' goal was to level the playing field and address the
disparity in bargaining power between franchisors, often major oil
companies, and franchisees in the petroleum industry.252 The PMPA was to
accomplish this goal by "providing a single, uniform set of rules governing
the termination of petroleum franchises and nonrenewal of petroleum

241. See also DraegerOil Co. v. Uno-Ven Co., 314 F.3d 299 (7th Cir. 2002) (analyzing
the PMPA).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 2801.
243. Dersch Energies, 314 F.3d. at 855-56.
at 849.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
at 851.
247. Id.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
at 853.
Id.
at 852-53.
DerschEnergies, 314 F.3d. at 867.
Id. at 855.
Id.
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franchise relationships., 253 The Act prohibits terminating or nonrenewing
franchise relationships, as described in § 2802(a) 254 except on grounds set
out in §§ 2802(b)(2)-(3) 255 or 2803(c) where notice is properly provided
pursuant to § 2804.256
MPA § 2805 provides for a federal civil action and also provides for
preliminary relief prior to the expiration of a franchise where nonrenewal or
termination notice has been provided by the franchisor.257 Section 2805(f)(1)
provides:
No franchisor shall require, as a condition of entering into or renewing the
franchise relationship, a franchisee to release or waive - (A) any right that the
franchisee has under this title or other Federal law; or (B) any right that the
franchisee may have under any valid and applicable State law.
The Court noted that the question of whether § 2805(0(1) contained an
implied private cause of action or may be the basis of a constructive
nonrenewal claim under the PMPA, was a question of first impression.259
Because it is a matter of statutory construction, the standard of review is de
novo. 26 0 The Court said that § 2805(f) must be viewed in the context of other
parts of the Act, and § 2805(a) provides for a civil action only where the
franchisor "fails to comply with the requirements of Sections 2802 or
2803. ''26i Similarly, § 2805(b) provides for equitable relief for failures to
comply with §§ 2802 and 2803. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the trial
court that the explicit causes of action in §§ 2805(a) and 2805(b) made it
"highly unlikely that Congress absentmindedly forgot to provide a cause of
action for § 2805(f)(1). 2 62 The Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court's guidance on this canon of statutory construction. 263 The Court
concluded that a franchisee could maintain an action under the PMPA for
§ 2805(f)(1) violations only if those violations amounted to a nonrenewal of
its franchise relationship under §§ 2802 and 2 80 3 .2 4
This led the Court to analyze whether Equilon's alleged violation of
§ 2805(f)(1) was a nonrenewal actionable under § 2802.265 Dersch argued
that because Equilon conditioned the renewal of the franchise relationship on

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 855-56.
15 U.S.C. § 2802(a) (2000).
Id. § 2802-3 (2000).
Dersch Energies, 314 F.3d at 856.
Id. at 856-57.
15 U.S.C. § 2805(f)(1) (2000).
Dersch Energies, 314 F.3d at 855.
Id.
Id.at 856-57. Section 2803 applies to trial and interim franchises and thus was not

at issue in Dersch Energies, since Dersch was a franchisee for over sixteen years. Id at
857 n.10.

262. Id.
at 857.
263. Id.See also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (holding that even
where a statute is phrased so as to create a right, plaintiff must show that the statute
manifests an intent to create not just a right but a remedy).
264. DerschEnergies, 314 F.3d. at 857-58.
265. Id.
at 858.
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Dersch's releasing or waiving certain of its rights under state and federal
law, Equilon's requirement constituted a constructive nonrenewal within the
meaning of the PMPA.266
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the trial court's
conclusion but not its reasoning, and cited a rule important in representing an
appellee: "[A]n appellate court may affirm the district court's [decision] on
any ground supported by the Record, even if different from the grounds
relied upon by the district court." 267 The trial court had concluded that the
renewal agreement was the same in substance as the original franchise
agreement and that any new contract terms were made in good faith and in
the normal course of business, as permitted by § 2802(b)(3)(A), and
therefore in effect circumvented the prohibitions of § 2805(f)(1).2 68 The
Seventh Circuit disagreed that the franchisee could use § 2802(b)(3)(A) to
"do an end run" around § 2805(f)(1)'s release and waiver prohibition.269
However, the Seventh Circuit did not resolve the question whether Equilon
had in fact sought releases and waivers of federal and state law rights.
Instead, the Court said that the first question to be asked was whether there
was a nonrenewal, either actual or constructive.270
To demonstrate a constructive nonrenewal, the Court said, the plaintiff
was required to show that at least one of the three basic elements of a
franchise agreement had been terminated or discontinued. 271 These three
elements were (1) the contract to use the refiner's trademark, (2) the contract
for the supply of motor fuel, and (3) the lease of the premises.272 Because
Dersch could not demonstrate that Equilon's alleged violations of
§ 2805(f)(1) resulted in the nonrenewal of the lease of retail premises, motor
fuel supply contract or the contract to use the Shell trademark in connection
with retail sales, Dersch
could not demonstrate the nonrenewal of its
273
franchise relationship.
The Court rejected Dersch's argument that its franchise was not
renewed because it signed under protest, thereby rejecting the theory earlier
endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in Pro Sales, Inc. v. Texaco, USA., 274 and
relied on by the dissent. 27' The Seventh Circuit majority concluded that
Dersch's position was weaker than the plaintiffs in Pro Sales, because in
266. Id.
267. Id. at 859.
268. Id. at 853.
269. Id. at 859.

270. Id. at 858 n.12.
271. Dersch Energies, 314 F.3d at 864. Constructive nonrenewals based on the loss of
one of the three elements had been recognized by the Seventh Circuit and other circuits,
according to the court. Id.
272. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2801 (1) (defining franchise as any contract between a
franchisor and franchisee under which the franchisor authorizes or permits the franchisee
to use, in connection "with the sale, consignment or distribution of motor fuel under a
trademark which is owned or controlled by such [franchisor] ... which authorizes or
permits such occupancy").
273. Dersch Energies, 314 F.3d at 860.

274. 792 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986).
275. 314 F.3d at 864-65.
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that case the plaintiff sought to invoke its rights under the PMPA
immediately upon signing the contested franchise agreement and also sought
preliminary relief under the continuing terms of the old franchise
agreement. 276 More importantly, said the Court, the Pro Sales decision
disregarded the explicit statutory provisions affording statutory protection to
nonrenewal, and
franchisees who receive formal notice of termination or
277
relied instead on legislative history to support its holding.

The Seventh Circuit declined to accept Dersch's and the dissent's
assertion that its analysis would force the plaintiff to face going out of
business before invoking the protections of the PMPA.278 On the contrary,
said the majority, Dersch could have permitted Equilon to issue a formal
279
notice of nonrenewal and then could have sought preliminary relief.
"However, by signing the renewal agreement, and thus renewing its statutory
'franchise,' Dersch divested itself of the right to bring an action under the
PMPA. 2 ° The Seventh Circuit explained: "the PMPA is only designed to
regulate a narrow aspect of petroleum franchise relationships - the
termination of franchises and the nonrenewal of franchise relationships. 2 8 '
The Court suggested that although Dersch failed to demonstrate that the
alleged § 2805(f)(1) violations amounted to a constructive nonrenewal, it
was possible for such violations to result in a nonrenewal. 8 2 Additionally,
the Seventh Circuit explained that § 2805(f)(1) could be enforced after notice
of termination is served, but before the termination takes effect, by
requesting preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to § 2805(b)(2).2 3
Moreover, the Court suggested that § 2805(f)(1) violations might be
PMPA, for example, through a state law claim, such
remedied outside of2 the
84
as economic duress.
Judge Cudahy's dissent asked a critical question: "[w]hat possible
purpose could Congress have had in amending the PMPA in 1994 to add
Section 2805(f)(1)?, 285 According to the dissent, the majority virtually
wrote § 2805(f)(1) right out of the United States Code and required a
franchisee to "commit economic suicide" by allowing its gasoline supply to
be terminated.286 The dissent's view of the statute's plain meaning was that
§ 2805(f) provided a private right to sue.2 87 The logic of the statute read as a
whole required that it provide a remedy for § 2805(f) violations. 288 The
dissent distinguished the statutory construction precedent relied upon by the
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majority as inapplicable in the situation where Congress clearly intended to
provide remedies and to empower private actors with a cause of action:
This is not, as the majority characterizes it, an attempt to read new types or
modes of remedies into the statute ....
Section 2805 clearly provides for
damages as well as injunctive relief. Nor is this an attempt to expand an
existing cause of action to capture new, extra statutory conduct ....
An
unarguable purpose of the statute is to furnish private rights to franchisees to
protect themselves from franchisors who use289imbalances in bargaining power
to force compliance with franchisor policies.
The dissent viewed Seventh Circuit precedent differently from the
majority. 29 In particular, the Beachler v. Amoco Oil Co.29 1 case cited by the
majority did not stand for the proposition that formal notice of nonrenewal
was required for relief; rather it suggested that PMPA arose as soon as
Equilon said "take-it-or-leave-it.' 292 The dissent also viewed the Ninth
Circuit decision in Pro Sales differently. Pro Sales should not be
distinguished on the basis of the plaintiffs promptness in seeking relief
because the nature of relief sought in this case was declaratory rather than
293
preliminary injunctive relief and did not require the same haste.
Moreover, Dersch complied with the requirement of filing suit within a year
of the "nonrenewal" as required by the statute. 294
Judge Cudahy also went on to examine whether the disputed contract
provisions did indeed require a release or waiver of any of Dersch's rights
under state or federal law and determined that one or more might and should
have been evaluated on remand.295
Another PMPA case was decided the same day as the Dersch case. In
Draeger Oil Co. v. Uno- Ven Co., 296 the Court held that the franchisor
properly terminated its franchise agreements. 297 In Uno- Ven, a group of
Midwest gasoline dealers for Union 76 gasoline filed suit under the
PMPA. 29' The defendants included several corporate lawyers and partners,

289. Dersch Energies, 314 F.3d 872-73.

290. Id. at 870-73.
291. 112 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997).
292. Dersch Energies, 314 F.3d at 870-71.
293. Id. at 871-72.
294. Id. at 872.
295. Id. at 873-75.
296. Draeger Oil Co. v. Uno-Ven Co., 314 F.3d 299 (7th Cir. 2002)

(Posner, Diane

P.

Wood, Evans, JJ.). The case was appealed from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin, No. 99-CV-317 (Clevert, J.). The counsel for plaintiffsappellants Draeger Oil Co., Swatek Sales Corp., Green Oil Co., Van Zeeland Oil Co., was
Ezra B. Jones, I11,of McGuire & Woods, Atlanta, GA; the counsel for defendantsappellees Uno-Ven Co., Midwest 76 Inc., was Susan G. Schellinger, of Davis & Kuelthau,

Milwaukee, WI and for defendants-appellees VPHI Midwest, Inc., PDV Midwest
Refining, LLC, Union Oil Co. of California, was Scott C. Solberg, of Eimer, Stahl,
Klevorn & Solberg, Chicago, IL.
297. Draeger Oil Co., 314 F.3d at 302.

298. Uno-Ven Co., 314 F.3d at 300. The gas was also sold under the name "Union" and
"76" and "Unocal," but for simplicity's sake reference will be made to "Union 76" as
including all the various names.
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including Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) and its 50-50
partnership, Uno-Ven. 299 The other partner, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDV),
was not named a defendant. 300 The partnership purpose was to refine crude
oil produced by PDV into gasoline refined by Unocal in Illinois and
marketed in the Midwest. 30 1 As part of the deal, Unocal licensed the "Union
76" trademark to Uno-Ven, and Uno-Ven licensed the marks to Midwest
gasoline dealers. 30 2 However, the partners eventually had a falling out
because PDV saw the deal as disadvantageous. 30 3 Unocal decided to get out
of refining and marketing and to focus on exploration and development.0 4
Unocal sold its refining and marketing assets to Tosco in 1996, including the
"Union 76" trademarks, subject to existing licenses (including the license to
Uno-Ven).3 °5
When Unocal and PDV dissolved Uno-Ven the following year, UnoVen notified the dealers that their franchises were to be terminated a year
following the notification because it was going out of business. 30 6 Uno-Ven
was to return the "Union 76" trademarks to Unocal (to be transferred to
Tosco).3 °7 PDV was to get Unocal's Illinois refinery and other Midwest
refining and marketing assets, and PDV agreed to support the trademark for
the year following termination notification. 30 8 Tosco, which then had
national rights to the "Union 76" mark, decided that at the end of the year in
which it was contractually bound to support the trademark, Tosco would not
issue any licenses in the310Midwest. 309 Thus, the mark was in effect
abandoned in the Midwest.
The nub of the gasoline dealer's suit was that the Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act was violated when Uno-Ven was dissolved in a way that
resulted in the death of the Union 76 trademarks in the Midwest. 31' The
plaintiffs argued that Unocal should have recaptured the Union 76 trademark
licenses for the Midwest dealers or transferred the Union 76 trademark to
PDV.312 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the UnoVen and Unocal.313 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.314
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Unocal's withdrawal from the
refinery business was in essence a lawful abandonment of property without

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id.at 299-300.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Draeger Oil, 314 F.3d at 300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id.
Id.
Draeger Oil, 314 F.3d at 301.
Id.at301-02.
Id. at299.
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value. 31 5 In such instances, a business has no obligation to compensate any
third parties that may be harmed by the withdrawal. 1 6
The Court assumed, without deciding, that Unocal was an affiliate of
Uno-Ven within the meaning of the PMPA, and thus subject to the Act
respecting the termination of the Uno-Ven franchises. 3 17 The Court said that
it was plain that the franchise termination was reasonable and in Unocal's
interest because Unocal wanted out of the marketing end of the oil business
3 18
and had transferred marketing rights to Tosco.
What is surprisingly absent from the Court's opinion is an examination
of the statute. The Court seems to be saying that a termination that makes
good business sense is lawful and therefore results in no duty to compensate
those harmed by its decisions. This appears to place the cart before the horse
and undermine the policy that resulted in more protection for franchisees.
The better approach would be to decide whether the Act creates a franchisor
duty to maintain a viable trademark.
In another case involving a franchisee protection statute, this time a
Wisconsin statute, the Land O'Lakes' logo came into play in Van Groll v.
Land 0' Lakes, Inc.319 Van Groll claimed he was protected under
Wisconsin's Fair Dealership Law (WFDL) because Land 0' Lakes made
him a "dealer." 320 Land 0' Lakes attempted to terminate the agreement
pursuant to which Van Groll hauled milk from dairy farmers to a Land 0'
Lakes production facility. 32 1 Van Groll alleged that Land 0' Lakes had
failed to provide proper notice prior to termination and claimed he was
entitled to damages, including the cost of his truck and the amount he paid to
buy out a partner. 322 Land 0' Lakes required Van Groll to wear a Land 0'
Lakes uniform while hauling milk and paid for its logo on Van Groll's
truck.323 Under the Wisconsin statute, a dealership requires an agreement
"by which a person is granted the right to sell or distribute goods or services,
or use a trade name, trademark, service mark, logotype, advertising or other
324
commercial symbol" in which there is a community of business interest.
The WFDL was intended to be liberally construed to protect dealers against
unfair treatment by grantors, who occupy superior economic and bargaining
315. Id. at 302.
316. ld
317. ld. at301.

318. Id.
319. 310 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, Diane P. Wood, Evans, JJ.). The case was

appealed from the Eastern District of Wisconsin (Reynolds, J.). The counsel for plaintiffappellant, Timothy J. Van Groll, was R. George Burnett, Tony A. Kordus, of Liebmann,
Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, Green Bay, WI; the counsel for Land O'Lakes, Inc.,
defendant-appellee, was Jonathan C. Miesen, of Linquist & Vennum, Minneapolis, MN.

320. Van Groll,310 F.3d at 568.
321. Idat 567.
322. Id at 569.
323. Id.at 567. Judge Evans wrote: "Van Groll and Land 0' Lakes agreed to a deal
giving Van Groll's trucking company, creatively named Tim Van Groll Trucking,
exclusive rights to haul milk .... Id.(emphasis added). The author believes this
gratuitous slight should have been left out of the opinion.
324. Van Groll,310 F.3d at 568.
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positions during dealership negotiations. 325 The district court concluded that
Van Groll was not a "dealer" within the meaning of the statute.326 The
Seventh Circuit agreed, affirming summary judgment in favor of the
defendant.327
The Seventh Circuit looked at three similar cases to determine whether
Van Groll "distributed goods" within the meaning of the statute defining
dealer.328 In Moodie v. School Book Fairs, Inc.,329 the Seventh Circuit held
that a truck driver who delivered books to school book fairs was a "dealer,"
within the meaning of the statute where, pursuant to a written agreement
giving him an exclusive distribution area, the truck driver was required to
maintain a place to store the books and required to maintain a truck to haul
the books. 330 The Seventh Circuit, in Rakowski Distributing, Inc. v.
332
Marigold Foods, Inc., 331 concluded that a milk hauler was not a "dealer."
The milk hauler was not required to purchase trucks or to build storage
facilities in order to satisfy their agreement, although it found it convenient
to do SO. 33 3 The hauler's responsibilities were limited to transporting
products to customers and did not include maintaining inventory, placing
products on shelves, monitoring customer inventories, or scheduling future
deliveries.334 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that a trucking company
was not a dealer where it picked up packages from customers and dropped
them off at a central location, in Kania v. AirborneFreight Corp.335
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Van Groll case more closely
resembled the Rakowski or Kania case, where the hauler was not a "dealer"
than the Moodie case. 336 Important to the Seventh Circuit in determining
whether Van Groll was a dealer was whether there was a community of
interest demonstrated by requirements from the grantor of additional
requirements.337 The Court concluded that Van Groll's expenses in buying
his truck and in buying out his former partner were not required by Land 0'
Lakes.338 The Seventh Circuit also rejected Van Groll's argument that a noncompete clause that applied to the farmers Van Groll served for Land 0'
Lakes indicated intertwined interests. 339 The Court was not persuaded that
Land 0' Lakes exerted control over Van Groll by giving Van Groll an
instruction manual which consisted of applicable federal and state
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328.
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330.
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332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 571.
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at 568-69.
889 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1989).
Van Groll, 310 F.3d at 568.
193 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999).
Van Groll, 310 F.3d at 568-69.
Id. at 569.
Id.
See id.
at 569 (citing 200 N.W.2d 63 (1981)).
Id. at 570.
Id.
at 569-570.
Id. at 569.
Van Groll, 310 F.3d at 570.
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regulations and required him to wear a clean uniform and to keep the milk
clean.34°
The Court also concluded that Van Groll's use of the Land 0' Lakes
trademark was not sufficient to make him a "dealer:" plaintiffs need to make
a "substantial investment in the trademark" and not just a de minimis use
before a dealer is considered "over the barrel" and protected under the Fair
Dealing Act. 34 1 "Simply put, defining 'dealership' in terms of trademark use
is meant to protect against situations in which a dealer spends money
advertising for or promoting a company, an investment that is lost when the
company terminates the relationship,"
the Court stated.342 Van Groll did not
343
investment.
make this financial
D. Insurance Coverage and Miscellaneous Matters
1.

Insurance Coverage

One of two cases in the last year looking at insurance coverage of
intellectual property claims 344 was Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hedeen &
Co. 345 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that a
commercial general liability insurance contract covering "advertising
injury"
346
gave rise to a duty to defend a trademark infringement suit.
The trademark claim was based on the use of Micro MachinesTM
347
trademarks on the letterhead of the Hedeens' toy development company.
Galoob Toys had entered into a royalty agreement with the Hedeens whereby
Galoob agreed to pay royalties for the right to market miniature toy
vehicles. 348 Galoob registered the Micro MachinesTM trademark, and the
product line grew in popularity, becoming a $700 million line of toys by
some estimates. 349 Royalty disputes began, and the Hedeens asserted breach
of the royalty agreements. 350 Galoob filed a declaratory judgment action and

340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.

343. Id. at 570-71.
344. See generally, Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Advertising Injury Insurance, 98
A.L.R. 5th 1 (2003) (discussing insurance coverage for allegations of copyright
infringement; David A. Gauntlett, Strategiesfor Funding IP Litigation: Insurance and its
Implications, in LITIGATING TRADEMARK, DOMAIN NAME, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
CASES, 133 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. eds., 2002).

345. 280 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2002) (Harlington Wood, Jr., Coffey, Williams, JJ.), reh 'g
and reh 'g en banc denied, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 3348 (7th Cir. Feb. 27, 2002). The case
was appealed from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin,
No. 97-C-0037 (Reynolds, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant, was Joshua G. Vincent,
of Hinshaw, Culbertson, Chicago, IL and Thomas Holden, Morison-Knox of Kasdorf,

Lewis, Walnut Creek, CA; the counsel for defendants-appellees,
Schmeckpeper, of Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, Milwaukee, W1.
346. CharterOak, 280 F.3d at 734.
347. Id. at 734.
348. id. at 733.
349. Id.
350. Id.
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in its amended complaint included a trademark claim based on the Hedeens'
use of Micro MachineTM on its company letterhead.35' Charter Oak refused
to defend the Hedeens.352
Charter Oak filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration
353
that it had no duty to defend the Hedeens on Galoob's trademark claim.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that
Charter Oak was required to defend and granted declaratory judgment in
favor of the Hedeens.354 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.355
Advertising injury was defined in the policy as injury "caused by an
offense committed in the course of advertising your goods, products or
services" and included injury arising out of "infringement of copyright, title
or slogan. 356 The Seventh Circuit concluded that "infringement ...of title"
was broad enough to encompass trademark infringement claims. 357 The
Court declined to follow the views of the Eighth and Sixth Circuits that the
language referred only to the noncopyrightable title of a book, film, or other
literary or artistic work.358 The Court also concluded that the use of Micro
MachineTM on the Hedeens' letterhead, as alleged in the complaint was an
advertising use that gave rise to a duty to defend because
it impacted "the
359
commercial public" and resulted in unlawful profits.
In another insurance coverage case, Platinum Technology, Inc. v.
Federal Insurance Co., the Seventh Circuit reviewed the factual question
whether a settlement was release of legal liability or a trademark sale. 3 60 The
trademark at issue was PlatinumTM, Platinum Software Corporation's (PSC)
federally registered trademark used in connection with its personal computer
software business. 361 Platinum Technology, Inc 362
(PTI) used PlatinumTM in
connection with its mainframe computer software.
In 1993, after PSC and PTI became aware of each other's use, they
reached a settlement agreement not to use PlatinumTM in markets where both
companies competed.3 63 In 1996, PSC considered rebranding itself and

351. Id.
352. Id. at 734.
353. CharterOak, 280 F.3d at 734.

354. Id.
355. Id. at 740.
356. Id. at 735.
357. Id.at 736.

358. Id.
359. Id. at 736-37.

360. 282 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2002) (Bauer,Coffey, Evans, JJ.), reh "gand reh 'g en
banc denied, No. 01-2503, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17763 (7th Cir. Apr. 17, 2002). The

case was appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, No. 99-C-7378, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1031 (N.D. I11.
Feb. 1, 2001) (Holderman,
J.). The counsel for Platinum Technology, plaintiff-appellee was John F. Zabriskie, of
Foley & Lardner, Chicago, IL; the counsel for Federal Insurance Co., defendant-appellant,
was Fred A. Smith, III
(Chicago, IL) and Kirk C. Jenkins (San Francisco, CA), Sedgewick,
Detert, Morgan & Arnold.
361. Platinum Technology, 282 F.3d at 930.
362. Id.
363. Id.
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approached PTI to see if it wanted to buy the PLATINUM trademark.364 The
parties could not agree on an amount and negotiations broke down.36 5 In
1997, PSC sued PTI for trademark infringement. 366 PTI informed Federal
Insurance of the lawsuit and, pursuant to the insurance policy, tendered its
defense to its insurer. 367 However, Federal refused to defend or indemnify
PTI.3 68 During the settlement negotiations PSC sought an amount sufficient
to rebrand itself.369 Settlement was reached in the amount of about $4
million cash and $6 million in original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
370
product credits.
PTI sued Federal in a four count lawsuit for failure to defend and
sought to recover the settlement amount. 371 The district court entered
summary judgment for PTI on Count 1, breach of duty, but ruled that there
2
was an issue of material fact and held a bench trial on the other counts.37
3 73
The district court awarded PTI over $9 million damages and attorney fees.
The Seventh Circuit reversed in part the judgment respecting the cash award
but found Federal liable for the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)
product credit cash amount. 374 Federal's argument on appeal was that the
cash amount was actually a purchase of trademarks and therefore an
unreasonable amount as a legal liability release. 375 This factual question was
reviewed and the Seventh Circuit concluded the district court had committed
clear error. 37 6 The Court noted that the settlement agreement was also called
a trademark assignment. 377 The Court found it compelling that PTI recorded
the PlatinumTM trademark as a new asset with a value of $4 million and
378
began depreciating it.
2. Laches
A pleasure of trademark cases is the likelihood that the reader has heard
of one of the parties or products, such as Nike and Michael Jordan, who
prevailed in the following case. The owner of JORDAN Blouse Division
was barred by laches on its trademark infringement claims against Nike and
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Id. at 930.

Id.
Platinum Technology, 282 F.3d at 930.

369. Id.
370. Id.

371. Id. at929.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 930-31.
374. Id. at 932-33. However, because the OEM judgment was based purely on
speculation, the appellate court remanded this issue to determine the monetary value of the
OEM credits. Platinum Technology, 282 F.3d at 933.
375. Id. at 931.
376. Id. at 932.
377. Id. See also Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1687-88 (1999) (discussing the judicial willingness to permit

firms to sell trademarks as things in and of themselves, apart from the item itself).
378. Platinum Technology, 282 F.3d at 930.
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Michael Jordan in ChattanogaManufacturing v. Nike.379
Since 1979, Chattanoga and its Jordan blouse division manufactured
women's apparel.38 ° Chattanoga never made or distributed men's clothing or
footwear. 381 Chattanoga applied for a trademark registration for JORDAN
for use on various women's apparel.382 The application was first made in
1997 and granted in 1998.383
Nike introduced its Michael Jordan-endorsed products in 1984,
including apparel and footwear for men, boys, and small children (with the
exception of a women's athletic shoe sold only in 1999).384 Nike used the
name JORDAN with various products, such as the JORDAN PULLOVER
and the JORDAN SHOOTING SHIRT and also used JORDAN with Nike's
Jumpman logo. 385 In 1997, Nike established the Jordan Brand Division of
Nike, devoted to producing and marketing Michael Jordan-endorsed
products.386 Under their contract, Nike was designated the "sole and
3 87
absolute owner" of the Michael Jordan-related marks.
Chattanoga filed suit alleging trademark infringement and unfair
competition under the Lanham Act. 388 Defendants alleged laches as a
defense and filed counterclaims seeking to have Chattanoga's mark
canceled. 389 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 390 The
trial court granted the defendants' motion on the ground of laches and denied
39 1
summary judgment on the remaining grounds.
The trial court noted that Chattanoga had constructive notice of Nike's
use of the JORDAN mark as early as 1985 and no later than 1990.392 The
trial court noted widespread advertisement of and media references to Nike's
Michael Jordan-endorsed products as JORDAN products. 393 The nine-year
delay from Chattanoga's latest notice date to the filing of the lawsuit created
379. 301 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2002) (Ripple, Kanne, Evans, JJ.). The case was appealed
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 140 F. Supp. 2d
917 (N.D. Il1. 2001) (Castillo, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant, Chattanoga

Manufacturing, was Timothy J. Riordan, of Defrees & Fiske, Chicago, IL and Robert 1.
Goodman, of Rye Brook, NY and Kenneth F. McCallion, McCallion & Assocs., New
York, NY; the counsel for defendant-appellee Nike, Inc., Keith W. Medansky, Alan S.
Dalinka, Piper Rudnick, Chicago, IL. The counsel for defendant-appellee Michael Jordan,
was Frederick J. Sperling, of Schiff, Hardin & Waite, Chicago, IL).
380. Chattanoga,301 F.3d at 791.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.at 792.
385. Id. at 791.
386. Id. at 792.
387. Chattanoga,301 F.3d at 791-92.
388. Id. at 792.
389. Id.

390. Id.
391. Id. The district court did grant Michael Jordan's motion on the alternative basis
that the evidence did not establish his personal liability. Id. at 792 n.2. When Chattanoga
failed to address that issue in its main brief, the Seventh Circuit deemed it waived. Id.
392. Id.at 792.
393. Id.
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a presumption of laches, for which Chattanoga failed to explain.39 4 The trial
court deemed the substantial amount of marketing and advertising by Nike of
its Jordan-endorsed products sufficient prejudice to preclude Chattanoga
395
from now asserting its rights.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found the district court did not abuse its
discretion in its analysis of laches. 396 Laches, it said, is established by
demonstrating: (1)the plaintiff knew the defendant was using the trademark,
(2) unexcused delay in taking action against defendant's use of the disputed
mark, and (3) prejudice to the defendant if plaintiff were allowed to assert its
rights after the delay. 397 On the first part of the analysis, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the district court had not erred in finding that Chattanoga had
constructive notice of Nike's use of Jordan through its national advertising
campaign. 398 Because Chattanoga conceded that since at least 1990 the
media referred to Michael Jordan-endorsed products as JORDAN products, it
was chargeable with knowledge of Nike's use of the JORDAN marks no
399
later than 1990.
On the reasonableness of the delay, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
district court had correctly looked to an analogous state statute of limitation
to see if a presumption of laches would apply.400 On the doctrine of
progressive encroachment, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, "Chattanoga
presents no evidence that over time Nike has directed its Michael Jordanendorsed products' marketing or manufacturing efforts to compete more
directly with Chattanoga's women's apparel, and therefore there was no
progressive encroachment. 40 1 Chattanoga attempted, but failed, to establish
that by creating the JORDAN BRANDS DIVISION. Nike was directly
marketing to women and therefore the statute should only begin to run after
the JORDAN BRANDS DIVISION was created in 1997.402
On the prejudice prong of the analysis, the Court noted that prejudice
may be shown where plaintiffs unexcused failure to assert its rights results
in a defendant relying to its detriment on that nonassertion and building up a
valuable business around the trademark.4 3 The conclusion that Nike had
been prejudiced was supported by the "vast" amount of money it spent.40 4
The Seventh Circuit modified the district court's dismissal of Nike's
counterclaims to be without prejudice, rather than with prejudice, because
some evidence existed that Chattanoga might try to "get even" with Nike by
passing off Chattanoga garments as Nike garments:

394. Id.

395. Id.
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397. Chattanoga,301 F.3d at 793.

398. Id.
at 793.
399. Id.
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403. Id.at 795.
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While we agree that the finding of laches moots Nike's counterclaims because
with that finding there is no ripe case or controversy between the parties, it was
error to dismiss the counterclaims with prejudice.... If a dispute ripens
405
between the parties, Nike should have the opportunity to litigate its claims.
3.

Phone Number Trademark

One risk of adopting a phone number as a trademark is the proscription
against selling phone numbers, which limits the alienability of such a
trademark.4 °6 However, in Jahn v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc.,407 the Seventh
Circuit concluded that a 1982/1986 royalty agreement respecting the transfer
of 1-800-FLOWERS did not violate the 1997 federal regulation prohibiting
the "selling of a toll free number40by
a private entity for a fee" because the
8
statute did not apply retroactively.
Jahn, the plaintiff, was originally the owner of a trucking business that
happened to have the number 1-800-356-9377.409 Another business person,
William Alexander, had an idea for a national flowers-by-phone business
and thought that 800-FLOWERS would be an ideal number. 410 However, if
one were to dial 800-FLOWERS, he would reach Jahn's business.41 1
Alexander approached Jahn with the floral business idea, and after testmarketing and other preparations, 800-FLOWERS was born. 412 Jahn
requested that AT&T transfer the number 800-FLOWERS and Jahn took an
equity interest in the new company and a royalty interest in revenues derived
from phone sales.41 3 By later
agreement, Jahn gave up the equity interest but
414
retained the royalty interest.
Jahn later filed suit, alleging that 800-FLOWERS was not paying the
full royalties due to him. 4 15 As part of its defense, 800-FLOWERS alleged
that royalties on the phone number were illegal due to the 1997 regulation
prohibiting phone number brokering.41 6 The district court entered judgment

405. Id.at 795-96.
406. 47 C.F.R. § 52.107(a) (2002).
407. 284 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2002) (Flaum, C.J., Bauer, Easterbrook,JJ.), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 102 (2002). The case was appealed from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin, No. 00-C-446-C (Crabb, C.J.). The counsel for
plaintiffs-appellants, Curtis P. Jahn, Capital Warehousing Corp., was Earl H. Numson, of
Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, Madison, WI; the counsel for defendants-appellees, 1800-Flowers.com, Inc., Fresh Intellectual Properties, Inc., 800-Flowers, Inc., was Jeffrey
A. Simmons, of William M. Conley, Foley & Lardner, Madison, WI.
408. Jahn, 284 F.3d at 811-12.
409. Id.
at 808.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. The 800-FLOWERS company had different corporate reorganizations over
time, including 800-Flowers (Wisconsin), 800-Flowers (New York), 800-Flowers (Texas),
and a parent corporation 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc. Id. at 809. For convenience, the
defendants are referred to as 800-FLOWERS.
413. Id.
414. Jahn, 284 F.3d at 809.
415. Id.
416. Id.
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for defendants, concluding that it need not decide retroactivity because each
on-going royalty payment obligation was a fresh violation of the
regulation. 1 7 The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. 1 8
The case turned on the question of the phone-number-brokering
regulation's retroactivity. The Seventh Circuit noted that federal regulations
do not apply retroactively unless that is explicitly authorized, and nothing in
this regulation explicitly provided for retroactivity. 41 9 The Seventh Circuit
rejected defendants' argument that the statute was not being applied
retroactively when applied to prospective royalty payments.47° The Court
differentiated between a deferred payment for an earlier lawful sale and a
current sale.421 Section 52.107 prohibited "selling" not payment, according
to the Court.422 The Court said:
A royalty is a risk-sharing agreement. Instead of paying Jahn up front the
estimated value of the phone number, the investors who established 800Flowers (Wisconsin) and its successors divided the risk with Jahn, so that he
would be paid only to the extent the new business succeeded. Suppose they
had done things otherwise-paying Jahn a lump sum and dividing the risk
among investors who financed that payment. Any attempt to force Jahn to
disgorge what he received in 1982 or 1986 would be retroactive. Yet this is
not different,
as an economic matter, from refusing to make ongoing
423

payments.

Thus, the phone-number-brokering regulation was not a defense for
800-FLOWERS permitting it to suspend royalty payments.424 Chief Judge
Flaum authored a very brief concurrence to reiterate that the Court was not
authorizing sale, brokering or hoarding of toll-free numbers, but merely
speaking to the unique circumstances of the case.425
Two aspects of the 800-Flowers case are particularly interesting in
terms of the Seventh Circuit's economic policy views. First, the Court called
a royalty a "risk sharing agreement." 426 The Court's view of the economics
of royalties, as discussed above, may well have impact in other areas. For
example, the Court's excoriation of the Brulotte decision in the Dolby case,
discussed infra, 427 cites the deferred royalty payment discussion in the 800Flowers case. Second, the Court analogized phone number assignments to
domain name assignments. 428 As a matter of economics, the Court saw value
in assigning both phone numbers and domain names to businesses that can
realize their goodwill and other economic value: "Moving assets to higher
417. Id.
418. Id. at 812.
419. Id. at 810.
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426. Id. at 811.
427. See infra notes 713-28 and accompanying text.
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and better uses is an important goal of any economic system. '' 429 The Court
cited policy reasons for restricting phone number brokering: the public
interest in the conservation of scarce toll free numbers and the FCC
obligation to promote the orderly use and allocation of toll free numbers.43 °
Similarly, domain names are a resource, precious to trademark owners,
which increasingly require conservation and orderly use and allocation, as
evidenced by dispute resolution procedures and federal protection against
anti-cybersquatting. 431 Thus, the Seventh Circuit view on economic policy
may well come through in future cases concerning domain name disputes,
and intellectual property law practitioners would do well to keep the Court's
views in mind.
III. COPYRIGHT
Fair use and copyright ownership led the parade of copyright cases
decided last year in the Seventh Circuit. In analyzing each, the Court
considered the "economic sense" of the circumstances. It also addressed
proper settlement conference procedure and criminal penalties for copyright
infringement.
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit announced that the
prevailing party in a copyright case, in which the monetary stakes are small,
should have presumptive entitlement to attorney's fees.
A. Fair Use
In Ty, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd. the Seventh Circuit
concluded that Beanie BabiesTM collector's guides, which included
photographs of the toys, may be a fair use of the copyrighted plush toy
design.432
Ty accused several Publications books of infringing its
copyrights. 433 The accused books ranged from a small-text "Beanie Babies
Collector's Guide" to "For the Love of Beanie Babies," with 150 glossy
photographs of Beanie BabiesTM with brief, "childish" text.434 The district
court granted summary judgment for Ty and rejected Publications' fair use
defense. 435 The Seventh Circuit reversed the summary judgment and

429. Id. at 810.
430. Id.at 809-10.
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432. 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (Flaum, C.J., Posner, Rovner, JJ.). The case was
appealed from U.S.D.C. (N.D. Ill. 2002), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15382 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 4,
2000) (Zagel, J). The counsel for plaintiff-appellee, James P. White, was Laurie A.
Haynie, of Welsh & Katz, Chicago, IL; the counsel for defendant-appellant, was William
Patry, of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York, NY. Notably, defense
counsel, Mr. Patry, is a former Solicitor to the Copyright Office and is an editor of
Lanham's Treatise "The Copyright Law," which includes a volume on copyright fair use.
Also, compare the discussion of copyright fair use, which exists pursuant to statute in this
Ty case, with the trademark "fair use" holding in the Ty case discussed supra in notes 11 44 and accompanying text.
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remanded for the trial court to separately consider the fair use defense for
each accused book.436
As guidance to the trial court on remand, the Seventh Circuit examined
the purpose of the fair use defense and its applicability to collector's
guides.437 The Court paid particular attention to the economic justifications
for the fair use doctrine. 438 The Court's explanation was based on an
analogy of fair use in book reviews. 439 The defense of fair use fosters
freedom of expression, maintained the Court, because it removes from the
copyright holder the control over criticism. 440 However, the defense of fair
use would fail, where a book reviewer quoted so much of the book that the
review was a substitute, rather than a complementary use, for the book.44'
Copying that is complementary to the work, "in the sense that nails are
complements of hammers," is permissible.442
Substitutional copying,
however, is not.443 In economic terms, fair use made sense because it cut
down on "transaction costs:"
[P]ublishers want their books reviewed and wouldn't want reviews inhibited
and degraded by a rule requiring the reviewer to obtain a copyright license
from the publisher if he wanted to quote from a book. So, in the absence of a
fair-use doctrine, most publishers would disclaim control over the contents of
reviews.
The doctrine makes444 such disclaimers unnecessary.
It thus
economizes on transaction costs.

The Seventh Circuit considered whether the accused books were
derivative works.445

The publications conceded that Beanie BabyTM

photographs were derivative works and Ty conceded that collector's guides
were not derivative works.446 The Court viewed the fair use question as
requiring an analysis of the text and photographs in each accused book to

436. Id. at 523-24. The Court concluded it had jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2000), of the copyright permanent injunction
order, despite outstanding trademark claims. Id. at 515-16.
437. Id. at 517.
438. Id.
439. Publications, 292 F.3d at 517. See also Richard A. Posner, When is ParodyFair

Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 69-70 (1992).
440. Publications,292 F.3d at 517.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. The Court viewed the term "substitutional" as less confusing than the oftenused "transformational" or "superseding" analysis. Id. at 518.
444. Publications,292 F.3d at 517. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326-29 (1989)
(discussing the reward theory as justification for copyright protection).
445. Publications, 292 F.3d at 518-19. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining
derivitative works as a "work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship."
446. Publications,292 F.3d at 519, 521.
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determine whether each should be considered more a compilation of photos
or a collector's guide.447 The Court concluded that a critical, evaluative
informational collector's guide was not a derivative work.448 The Court
noted that "Ty's concession that a Beanie Babies collectors' guide is not a
derivative work narrows the issue presented by PIL's appeal nicely (at least
as to those books that are plausibly regarded as collectors' guides) to whether
PIL copied more than it had to in order to produce a marketable collector's
guide."'449 The Court observed that a collector's guide would not serve its
function if it were less than comprehensive and that congruously a complete
copy was not per se excepted from fair use. 450 The Court rejected Ty's
argument that including photographs went too far.4 5 1 The Seventh Circuit
said that without the photographs a collector's guide would "sink like a stone
in the marketplace no matter how clever and informative its text., 452 The
Court concluded that the fair use characterization of the Beanie BabyTM
books was a fact-laden issue inappropriate for summary judgment, with the
possible exception of "For the Love of Beanie Babies. 453
The Court appeared to consider the question of derivative work as
determinative of fair use. 54 However, the analyses are not synonymous.
The preparation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as described in Section 106 of the Copyright Act. However,
whether an accused book was a derivative work would not answer whether it
could be considered a fair use: "notwithstanding the provisions of Sections
106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work.., is not an
infringement., 455 A discussion of the burden of proof, both the initial burden
and the burden of persuasion, might have better informed the Court's
opinion. Without the initial proof that an exclusive right had been infringed,
there would be no need to establish a fair use defense. As a matter of proof,
if the preparation of a collector's guide was not the preparation of a
derivative work, then there would be no need to establish the defense.456
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit's use of an economic justification for

447. Id. at 523.
448. Id. at 521.
449. Id.

450. Id.
451. Id.

452. Id.
453. Publications, 292 F.3d at 523. The Court noted Ty's argument that its situation
was analogous to Twin Peaks Products,Inc. v. Publications,International,996 F.2d 1366

(2d Cir. 1993), concluding that plot summaries of television series were not fair use and
Castle Rock Entertainmentv. CarolPublishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998),
concluding that Seinfeld trivia question book was not a fair use. Id. at 521-23. However,
the court determined that the trial court was better positioned to decide the matter in the
first instance. Id. at 523.
454. Id. at 518-20.
455. 17 US.C. § 107 (2000).
456. For a discussion on the proper scope of derivative works and whether economic
analysis lends itself to this question, see Lee v. A.RT. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the mounting of copyright notecards on ceramic tiles does not constitute
preparation of derivative works in violations of the Copyright Act).
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fair use in this Ty case seems out of step with the primarily noncommercial
nature of the defense, being the copyright infringement exceptions where
necessary for scientific, educational or free speech purposes.
B.

Ownership

Copyright ownership cases decided by the Seventh Circuit during the
survey period were straightforward. In Liu v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 45 7 the
dispute centered on improvements to tax preparation software. 458
Yang, a Price Waterhouse employee, sought out programmers in China
to increase the speed of RevUp32, a subprogram used to speed up the Price
Waterhouse software called the Tax Management System (TMS).459 Yang
selected the Sichuan Sky Company Limited to do the work. 460 To alleviate
Yang's concern that she would be excluded from future projects, Price
Waterhouse sent her a letter stating that if Yang met the objectives of the
project, Price Waterhouse would hire her to head future projects in China. 6'
By letter agreement, the arrangement stated:
Price Waterhouse LLP agrees to pay $25,000 (twenty-five thousand dollars)
for each 25% increase in TMS speed resulting from work on the RevUp. After
the initial 25% improvement is achieved, payment will be made in $1,000
increments for each percentage increase. For example, if the speed is
increased by 49%, Price Waterhouse will pay $49,000.00 .... It is clearly
understood that the source code is the sole property of Price Waterhouse and
Price Waterhouse gives no authority, implied or otherwise, to distribute or
copy this source code in any way. Upon completion
462 of the project, ALL
source code will be given back to Price Waterhouse.
Price Waterhouse thereafter disclosed the source code for RevUp32 to
Yang.463 She disclosed the source code to Sichuan Sky, who increased the
operating speed of the program by 264% with its China RevUp32, entitling
Yang to $264,000.464 Yang sent the object code to Price Waterhouse, but
withheld the source code asking that Price Waterhouse first pay her and
guarantee her future work in China. 465 Price Waterhouse refused to pay until

457. 302 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2002) (Harlington Wood, Jr., Kanne, Rovner JJ.). The case
was appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
No. 97 C 3093 (Holderman, J), 182 F. Supp. 2d 666 (N.D. II. 2001). The counsel for
plaintiffs-appellants, was Dean A. Monco, of Wood, Phillips, VanSanten, Clark &
Mortimer, Chicago, IL; the counsel for defendants-appellees, was Leslie M. Smith, of
Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL.
458. Liu, 302 F.3d at 751.

459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 751-52.
Source code is the program's operating instructions written in a format allowing
the computerprogrammerto use, maintain, and revise the program. Id at 752 n. I. While
an object code is the instructions written in a format that the computer can read. Id. at 755
n.2.
464. Liu, 302 F.3d at 752.

465. Id.
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it received the source code.466 Sichuan Sky claimed ownership in the
improved program but then. assigned any ownership interest to Yang's
daughter, Liu.467 Yang registered the copyright for the improved program in
Liu's name.468
At this point, Price Waterhouse sold the tax management software
business to Computer Language Research (CLR).469 For a year, CLR sold
the tax management software including the China RevUp32 improvement.47 °
Price Waterhouse and CLR then contacted the original programmer of
RevUp32 and had him write a faster program.47' CLR substituted that
improvement for the China RevUp32 improvement.472 Liu then filed suit
against Price Waterhouse and CLR, claiming copyright infringement and
breach of contract.473 A jury determined that Price Waterhouse and CLR
owned the copyrights for both the China RevUp32 and the original
RevUp32.474 Liu moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the
grounds that Sichuan Sky had owned and transferred the copyrights to Liu.475
The district court denied the motions, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.476
The Seventh Circuit noted that the parties did not dispute that the China
RevUp32 was a derivative work.477 While the Copyright Act makes authors
of derivative works the presumptive owners of the copyrights in their
contribution to the adaptation but not in the underlying work, it allows
parties to adjust those rights by contract, said the Court.478 Moreover,
because the owner of the original work possesses the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works, the derivative work preparers were limited to only
authorized permissible uses of the original work. 479 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the letter agreement authorizing Yang to recruit Sichuan Sky
was ambiguous as to copyright ownership in the derivative work. 480 Thus,
the Court looked to the intent of the parties. 481 The statement that "upon
completion of the project, ALL source code will be given back to Price
Waterhouse," viewed in the light most favorable to Price Waterhouse and
CLR (as required after the jury verdict in their favor), indicated that Price
Waterhouse was intended to own the copyright.482
The possibility of better protection than copyright through contractual
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

471. Liu, 302 F.3d at 752.

472.
473.
474.
475.

Id.
Id.
at 753.
Id.
Id.

476. Id. at 753, 757.

477. Id. at 754.
478. Liu, 302 F.3d at 754.

479.
480.
481.
482.

Id.
Id. at 754-55.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 735.
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alternatives is amply demonstrated in Dispatch Automation, Inc. v. Richards.
In Dispatch Automation, the Seventh Circuit decided a diversity breach of
contract action in favor of the defendant software developers. 483 The
contract dispute centered on the ownership of a software program.484 The
software developer, Richards, had created a program called RiMS to help
police and fire departments with records management and dispatch.485 Later
he and his wife brought in another husband and wife team to help with
marketing. 486 They formed a corporation, and the articles of incorporation
stated:
Among the principal products sold by the corporation will be the RIMS group
of computer-aided dispatch and records management software products. RIMS
is owned by Anthony B. Richards and will be licensed to the corporation. A
license fee of $1.00 per year will be paid to Anthony B. Richards. All
proceeds from the sales of the product will accrue to the corporation. The
corporation may continue to develop
the product but all ownership rights will
487
remain with Anthony B. Richards.
After the formation of the corporation in 1993, Richards developed
subsequent versions of RiMS. 488 At about the time Richards was working on
RiMS 2000, the couples had a falling out and Richards cancelled the RiMS
license to the corporation and resigned from the corporation. 489 The
corporation sued the Richards for breach of contract, asserting that it owned
RiMS 2000 because it was a new product and not a development of the
earlier RiMS programs. 490 The district court granted summary judgment to
the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury, on the basis of the
evidence gathered in pretrial discovery, could find that the corporation,
rather than Mr. Richards, was the owner.4 91 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.492
Dispatch Automation argued that the by-laws gave ownership of new
products to it and only small incremental changes in RiMS were owned by
Richards.493 Richards argued that he retained ownership in all revisions of
computer-aided dispatch and records management software, conceding that
the corporation owned other types of products.494 The Seventh Circuit
agreed with Richards:
483. 280 F.3d 1116, 1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner,Ripple, Diane P. Wood, JJ.)
The case was appealed from the United States District Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin, No. 00 C 454 (Shabaz, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant, Dispatch
Automation, Inc., was Darren S. Cahr, Richard Young, of Gardner, Carton & Douglas; the
counsel for defendants-appellees, Richards, was Lee M. Seese, of Stafford Rosenbaum,
Madison, WI).
484. Dispatch Automation, 280 F.3d at 1117.

485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 1117-18 (emphasis added).

488. Id.
at 1118.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Dispatch Automation, 280 F.3d at 1117.

492. Id. at 1121.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 1117.
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We think that Richards must be right in his understanding of the difference
between a new product and the further development of old product. It would
have been cockeyed - it would have been contrary to Dispatch Automation's
own interests as they then appeared-for the parties to have agreed that
Richards would own successive versions provided they made only incremental
improvements over their predecessors but that he would have no rights to a
successive version that made a real breakthrough. That would have given him
an incentive to pull his punches, or to quit the company if he thought he was
on the brink of a breakthrough; neither the articles of incorporation nor, so far
any other contractual provision binds Richards to Dispatch
as we are aware,
4 95
Automation.

The Court adopted the Richards' interpretation rather than the
corporation's, which made no "economic sense. ' 496 The Court rejected the
corporation's argument that it was a new product because Richards described
RiMS 2000 in a product statement as "a completely different product
underneath, a 100% rewrite of RiMS in a new language with a new
database. 497 The Court said that, putting aside the "sales puffery," from the
user's standpoint it was not all that new or different and continued to fit
The Court also noted
"snugly" within the correct contract interpretation.
that one might wonder why no one had registered the program with the
copyright office, but suggested that contractual alternatives to copyright
might have given the owner more protection, citing commentary to that
499
effect.
C. Attorney's Fees
The propriety of awarding attorney's fees was at issue in Gonzales v.
Transfer Technologies, Inc.500 Gonzales owned copyrights on several T-shirt
designs. 50 1 Transfer Technologies manufactured and sold temporary tattoos
identical to his designs. 502 Transfer Technologies stopped producing the
infringing tattoos when Gonzales filed suit. 50 3 Gonzales did not seek actual
damages.5 04 He was awarded $3000 in statutory damages. 50 5 Gonzales did,

495. Id. atl1118-19.

496. Id.at 1119.
497. Id. at 1120.
498. Dispatch Automation, 280 F.3d at 1120.

499. Id. at 1120-21. The court cited ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-55
(7th Cir. 1996); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law andPolicy ofIntellectual
PropertyLicensing, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 111, 124-33 (1999); cf. Oz Shy, The Economics of
Copy Protection in Software and Other Media, INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE
ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 97 (Brian Kahin
& Hal R. Varian, eds. 2000).

500. 301 F.3d 608, 609 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, Kanne, Evans, JJ.). The case was
appealedfrom Gonzales v. Kid Zone, Ltd., No. 00 C 3969 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17579
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2001) (Kocoras, C.J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant, was Edward
G. Wierzbicki, of Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson, Chicago, IL.
501. Gonzalez, 301 F.3d at 608.
502. Id.
503. Id.

504. Id.at 609.
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however, seek attorney's fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505.506 The trial court
declined to award attorney's fees because "Transfer's actions, though willful,
are not the kind of flagrant behavior that would justify an award of attorney's
fees., 50 7 The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The Seventh Circuit
508
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
According to the Seventh Circuit, the factors that the Supreme Court
suggested for consideration by .courts in determining whether to award
attorney's fees "seem rather miscellaneous and ill-assorted."' 50 9 These four
nonexclusive factors included "frivolousness, motivation, objective
unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal components of the
case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance consideration of
compensation and deterrence."5 10 The Seventh Circuit observed that,
according to the Fogerty standard, "copyright defenses
are as important as
51
copyright claims" since they add to the public domain.
Despite the trial court's broad discretion whether to award attorney's
fees, the Seventh Circuit did require sufficient explanation by the trial judge
for his decision. 51 2 The Seventh Circuit noted that deterrence was an
important factor in cases with small damage awards:
No one can prosecute a copyright infringement suit for $3,000. The effect of
the district court's decision if universalized would be to allow minor
infringements, though willful, to be committed with impunity, to be in effect
privileged, immune from legal address. The smaller the damages, provided
there is a real, and especially a willful, infringement, the stronger the case for
an award of attorneys' fees.
The Seventh Circuit went on to suggest that in copyright cases of small
monetary value the prevailing party should enjoy a "presumptive entitlement
to attorneys' fees. '514 The Court vacated the attorney's fees ruling and
51 5
remanded the case for further consideration.
D. Criminal CopyrightInfringement and Miscellaneous Matters
In one of two appeals from criminal prosecutions for intellectual
property violations, 5 16 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the restitution order in
United States v. Kah Choon Chay.51 7 The order required payment of
505. Id.

506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Gonzalez, 301 F.3d at 609.

509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.

512.
513.
514.
515.

Id.
Id. at610.
Id.
Id.

516. See infra notes 517-26 and accompanying text.
517. 281 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2002) (Bauer, Ripple, Rovner, JJ.). The case was
appealed from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, No.
01-CR-0021-C-01 (Crabb, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellee, was Timothy M.
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approximately $50,000 to victim companies holding copyrights."' Chay
confessed and pled guilty to counterfeit computer program trafficking,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2318(a), but challenged his penalty. 9
Chay argued three reasons why the restitution amount should be
decreased.5 20 First, Chay argued that the government failed to include a
sufficient victim impact statement, pursuant to sentencing guidelines and
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 34(b)(4)(D) and (F). 5 2' The Court
rejected this argument because an addendum to the presentencing report
(PSR) was deemed sufficient in listing the individual victim companies along
with the amount each lost (number of copyrighted games multiplied by
price). 22 Chay's second argument was that the district court erred in failing
to consider his modest financial condition.5 23 According to the Seventh
Circuit, the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, bars the
Court from examining the defendant's ability to pay restitution, so the Court
rejected that contention as well.524 Third, Chay argued that, in calculating
the victim's losses, the Court should have subtracted (from the numbertimes-price calculation) Chay's cost in copying and distributing the
copyrighted material. 525 The Seventh Circuit determined that the district
court's calculation was not an abuse of discretion:
Mr. Chay's position is somewhat analogous to a bank robber asking that the
amount of money he returns to a bank be offset by the cost of robbing it. We
do not think the holder of the copyright
ought to be required to subsidize the
52 6
cost of Mr. Chay's illegal activity.
An issue in civil copyright cases is whether settlement talks are binding
on the parties. The risk of on-the-record settlement talks is intuitive; the
danger of off-the-record settlement talks was shown in Lynch, Inc. v.
SamataMason, Inc.52 7 In Lynch, the trial court dismissed the copyright
infringement litigation
with prejudice but retained jurisdiction to enforce the
5 28
settlement agreement.
The parties met for a settlement conference in the magistrate judge's

O'Shea, of the Office of the United States Attorney; the counsel for defendant-appellant,
was Koua C. Vang, Madison, WI.
518. Kah Choon Chay, 281 F.3d at 683.
519. Id.

520. Id. at 685.
521.

Id. at 685-86.

522. Id. at 686.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Kah Choon Chay, 281 F.3d at 686-87.
526. Id. at 687.
527. 279 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2002) (Bauer, Posner, Easterbrook, JJ.). The case was
appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Div., No. 99C4357 (Denlow, Mag. J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant, was Robert S.
Pinzur, Long Grove, IL; the counsel for defendants-appellees, was Sheri J. Engelken,
Michael Kazan, Jeffrey S. Norman, of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL.
528. Lynch, 279 F.3d at 489.
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chambers.5 2 9 The parties agreed to a settlement in principle. 530 However,
neither the discussions nor the ensuing agreement were recorded or
transcribed. 53' After the conference, the parties exchanged drafts of a
settlement agreement, but could not agree on one paragraph.532 The parties
agreed to submit competing versions of that paragraph to the court and the
court would determine if the issue was settled and if so, to determine which
version should be included in the settlement.5 33 The magistrate judge
approved the defendant's version and directed the parties to execute that
version, but the plaintiff refused.534 The trial court dismissed the litigation
with prejudice but stated in the order that the court was retaining jurisdiction
to enforce the settlement agreement. 535 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
dismissal. 36
The Seventh Circuit noted that, having dismissed with prejudice the
copyright action, the trial court had no jurisdiction to do anything further
because any action on the settlement agreement would have to be brought in
state court due to the parties' lack of diversity.5 37 Even though the settlement
was of a federal copyright action, state contract law would govern any
subsequent suit to enforce the settlement, said the Seventh Circuit.
Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed, it strongly cautioned against the
practice followed by the magistrate judge in this case. 38 The circuit court
stressed that, during the conference in question, the magistrate judge should
have invited a court reporter who should have recorded39 the terms of the
5
settlement, as understood and agreed upon by the parties.
540
"But there is no use crying over spilled milk," quipped the Court.
Despite its disapproval of the trial court's handling of the settlement
conference, the Seventh Circuit determined that remand would be fruitless.5 41
Two years' passing would hardly improve the participants' recollections,
particularly in view of the settlement's complexity, so the Seventh Circuit
concluded that future proceedings would be unreliable.542
The Seventh Circuit also declined to adopt a per se rule to void
settlements where the written record did not resolve the questions whether
the case was actually settled. 543 The Court favored the policy of encouraging
candid discussions.5 44 The Court noted that settlement conferences were not
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

535. Lynch, 279 F.3d at 489.

536.
537.
538.
539.
540.

Id. at 492.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490-91.
Id.
Id. at491.

541. Lynch, 279 F.3d at 491.

542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id.
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required by statute to be on the record.545 The Court adopted the Second
Circuit's approach, writing "if neither party asks that any part of the
discussion be recorded, the judge's failure to insist that a settlement546reached
in such a discussion be recorded does not invalidate the settlement.,
The Seventh Circuit suggested that both parties had assumed the risk
that the judge might remember the settlement conference differently. 547 The
Court suggested two alternatives that would have assisted the copyright
owner. The parties could have asked the Court to read the settlement into the
record. 548 Alternatively, the parties could have clarified that the meeting was
a settlement conference and would not be deemed final yet. 549 For either
alternative, the copyright owner would have a basis to challenge the district
court's recollection that the case had been settled, even if it required asking
550
the district court judge to take the witness stand or answer questions.
Having used neither, the Court said that the copyright owner had to "live
with the consequences. 55'
Although the warning comes in an unpublished decision, the risk of
defending intellectual property charges pro se was manifest in Lyons
Partnership,L.P. v. Holmes.552 Lyons charged that Holmes' use of purple
dinosaur and green dinosaur costumes in her costume shop violated Barney
and Baby Bop copyrights.553 After initial denials that she ever owned or
rented "putative" Barney and Baby Bop costumes at her costume shop, later
discovery responses revealed that defendant had the costumes.55" The
district court found the initial discovery responses "willfully dishonest" and
granted a default judgment as a discovery sanction. 555 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the default judgment and the award of statutory damages and
attorney's fees.556
The Seventh Circuit did not accept the defendant's argument that she
had been confused about the meaning of "putative;" it found no clear error in
the trial court's determination that she was "dissembling," and not
"confused., 557 The Seventh Circuit was not convinced that the choice of
sanction was "fundamentally wrong." 558 Notwithstanding her pro se status,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the district court
abused its discretion in failing to grant her a jury trial.559 The Court
545. Id.
546. Id. at491.
547. Id.
548. Lynch, 279 F.3d at 491.
549. Id.

550. Id.
at 492.
551. Id.at491.
552. No. 01-3640, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7500 (7th Cir. April 18, 2002) (Bauer,
Kanne, Wood, JJ.) (per curiam).
553. Holmes, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS at *3.

554. Id.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *8.
Id.
at *5-6.
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7-8.
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untimely because it came a year and a half
such a motion, after the last pleading was
560
Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), (d).
56 1
applied equally to pro se litigants.

V. TRADE SECRETS
In 2002, the Seventh Circuit focused on whether the information at
issue was really secret in trade secret cases. Procedural matters were also
addressed, including statutes of limitation, mootness of a preliminary
injunction, and the specificity required to keep trade secrets under seal on
appeal.
A.

Secrecy

A trade secret owner lost on its trade secret claim by failing to identify
the secrets with sufficient specificity in IDX Systems Corp. v. Epic Systems
Corp.,562 IDX filed its diversity suit against two former Epic employees,
Quade and Rosencrance, who then managed data processing at the
University of Wisconsin Medical Foundation. 563 IDX claimed that Quade
and Rosenscrance conveyed trade secrets in IDX software to Epic, enabling
Epic to improve its own software package and take business away from
IDX.564 IDX charged trade secret theft, breach of confidentiality contract,
and tortious interference with business relations. 565 The district court granted
summary judgment on the trade secret claim because IDX failed to
demonstrate what part of its software was a trade secret. 566 The district court
567
also dismissed the tort claims as preempted by Wisconsin trade secret law.
The Court deemed the confidentiality agreement unenforceable for lack of
geographic and temporal restrictions. 568 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment and reversed on the breach of contract and tort claims.569
The Seventh Circuit rejected IDX's attempts to define its trade
secret. 570 The 43-page description of the methods and processes of the
560. Holmes, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS at *7.
561. Id.
562. 285 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook,Ripple, Wood, JJ.). The case was
appealed from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, 165
F. Supp. 2d 812 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (Shabaz, J.). The counsel for plaintiff appellant, was

Kenneth Starr, of Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, DC and William A. Streff, of Kirkland &
Ellis, Chicago, IL; the counsel for defendants-appellees Mitchell Quade and Michael
Rosencrance, was Barbara A. Nedier, Stafford Rosenbaum, also for Michael Rosencrance,
Steven M. Streck, Axley Brynelson, Madison, WI, for University of Wisconsin Medical
Foundation, Jon G. Furlow, Michael, Best & Griedrich, Madison, WI, for Westfield Ins.
Co., Michael P. Crooks, Peterson, Johnson & Murray, Madison, WI.
563. IDXSystems, 285 F.3d at 583.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 587.
570. IDXSystems, 285 F.3d at 583.
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software failed to adequately delineate what was secret, as opposed to wellknown. 571 Data entry screens for example, were readily ascertainable by
proper means, and "a trade secret claim based on readily observable material
is a bust." 572 While underlying algorithms might be trade secrets, IDX had
not separated those nor shown that the defendants decompiled the code or
otherwise obtained access to the algorithms: "[i]t alleges only that
Foundation transferred to Epic those details that 573
ordinary users of the
software could observe without reverse engineering."
However, the Seventh Circuit concluded in favor of IDX that it could
validly restrict its customers' use of its software, precluding its examination
for the purpose of creating another system. 574 This was not an unlawful
restriction on human capital like the ill-favored employee non-compete
clauses. 575 This was a protection of intellectual property that did not harm or
restrict competition so long as competitors are gathering information, not
"spong[ing] off another's intellectual property." 576 The Court also rejected
the notion that a geographic limitation on the confidentiality agreement was
required, noting that "[k]nowledge does not respect borders. 577 The Court
remanded the case for trial on the contract claims. 578 The Court also
concluded that state trade secret law did not conflict with5 79
the asserted tort
law claims, noting the absence of any precedent so holding.
The following case also dealt with proving secrecy. The Seventh
Circuit announced a new practice respecting protective orders and trade
secrets in Baxter Internationalv. Abbott Laboratories,58 a case reviewing an

arbitration between a patentee of an invention and an exclusive licensee.
The issue involved
the scope of the discovery and what information is to be
58 1
made public:

Because no prior published opinion has made clear the need for specificity in
motions [to maintain documents under seal] of this kind, we will allow these
parties to amend their motion a second time. Having
requirements, however, the court will in the fitture deny
under Operating Procedure 10 that does not analyze in
document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons

explained the legal
outright any motion
detail, document by
and legal citations.

571. Id. at 583-84.
572. Id. at 584.
573. Id.
574. Id.
at 585-86.
575. Id.
at 585.
576. Id.
577. IDXSystems, 285 F.3d at 586.
578. Id at 587.
579. Id.
at 586-87.
580. 297 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook,Kanne, Williams, JJ.). The case was
appealed from the Northern District of Illinois, Nos., 01 C 4809 & 01 C 4839 (Guzman,
J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant Baxter International, was Constantine L. Trela, of
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Chicago, IL; the counsel for defendant-appellee Abbott
Laboratories, R. Mark McCareins, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, IL)), later proceeding 315
F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2003), reh g and reh g in banc denied, No. 02-2039 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6896 (7th Cir. Apr. 10, 2003).
581. Baxter, 297 F.3d at 547.
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Motions that represent serious efforts to apply the governing rules will be
entertained favorably, and counsel will be offered the opportunity to repair
shortcomings. Motions that simply assert a conclusion
without the required
582
reasoning, however, have no prospect of success.
In Baxter, the Seventh Circuit considered a joint motion by the parties
to file seven envelopes of documents pertaining to the appeal under seal.583
The Seventh Circuit motions judge denied the motion without prejudice,
explained the motion's problems, and permitted renewal.584 The parties'
revised, joint motion exposed that they had previously overclaimed
confidentiality for most of the documents. 585 The parties even requested that
the contract documents at the heart of their dispute should remain under seal,
arguing that confidentiality was an integral part of their agreement. 586 The
Seventh Circuit rejected this as contrary to the policy set forth in Grove
Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co.,587 "that the dispositive
documents in any litigation enter the public record, notwithstanding any
earlier agreement., 588 This rule permits observers to know what the suit is
about and to assess the judges' disposition: "Not only the legislature but also
students of the judicial system are' entitled to know what the heavy financial
subsidy of litigation is producing. 589

The only information entitled to be kept secret on appeal, according to
the Court, included (1) trade secrets; (2) "information covered by a
recognized privilege (such as the attorney-client privilege);" and (3)
"information required by statute to be maintained in confidence (such as the
name of a minor victim of a sexual assault). 590 The question for trade
secrets is whether the information derives economic value from its being
kept secret. 591 A flat claim that disclosure could harm a party's competitive
position was insufficient.592 The Court considered the assertion that
confidentiality promoted both parties' business interests for five documents
that included a copy of a confidential licensing agreement between Abbott
and a third party.593 The Seventh Circuit was dissatisfied with the lack of
any justifications or explanations by the litigants as to why disclosure of the
agreement would be harmful for the parties and why such harm justifies
secrecy.594 All that the parties presented, the Court stressed, was "ukase. 595
The Court further noted that the joint motion failed to cite a single

582. Id. at 548 (emphasis added).

583. Id. at 545.
584. Id. at 547.

585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.

Id.
Id
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statute, rule, or opinion, despite the596motions judge's having stressed the need
for specifics and detailed analysis.
The Court suggested that parties, fearing harm from disclosure could
agree to submit to arbitration, which the parties had done in the instant
case.59 7 Baxter's breaking of its word to resolve the suit in private might
support a cause of action for damages for breach of contract, surmised the
598
Court, but not specific performance of the confidentiality agreement.
"[Baxter] had, and spurned," said the Court, "a sure path to dispute
resolution with complete confidentiality: accept the result of the closed
arbitration."' 599 The Court also suggested that the parties could "pare down
the appellate record" and could ask for non-important documents to be
returned.600
The fate of trade secrets during litigation is a major concern for entities
that choose this form of protection for technology rather than possible
copyrights or patents. 601 In trade secret litigation, different courts take
different views on the strictness of proof, some requiring the lighter burden
of providing notice of trade secrets and others like the Seventh Circuit, in
IDX for example, requiring more specificity. 60 2 Often trade secrets that are
discoverable in litigation are not even the primary basis of a suit but rather
are financial information relevant to damages or collateral issues. Protective
orders may be sought pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
protect confidential information. 60 3 A recent national trend, however, finds
courts, particularly federal circuit courts of appeal, treating with more
60 4
suspicion parties' attempts to maintain confidentiality of their information.
Particularly suspect are
blanket protective orders covering all technical and
60 5
financial information.
A cautionary note to practitioners in the Seventh Circuit is that where
confidential information, even that required by agreements to be maintained
in confidence, is the basis of a court decision, the party should expect it to be
made public. Meticulous analysis is now required for success on any motion
to maintain documents under seal filed in the Seventh Circuit or in the
district courts in its region.

596. Id.
597. Id.
598. Id. at 547-48.

599. Id.at 548.
600. Id.
601. See generally Susan V. Metcalfe, Comment, Protecting Trade Secrets: Is The
Remedy Worse Than The Wrong?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 503 (2003) (noting that there is a
Catch 22 for trade secrets: in order to seek court protection for trade secrets, the secrets
must be revealed).
602. 1DX Systems Corp., 285 F.3d at 584-85.
603. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
604. Kurt Putnam, Note, Your Trade Secret Is Safe With Us: How The Revision To
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Makes Discovery Presumptively Confidential, 24
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 427, 428 (2002).
605. Id.at 430-34.
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Statute ofLimitations

In a case reflecting a scattershot approach to an appeal, Research
Systems Corp. v. IPSOS Publicite, °6 the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment
in favor of the defendants accused of trade secret theft and other violations of
state and federal law. 60 7 RSC accused the defendants, collectively IPSOS, of
stealing its trade secrets respecting its ARS Persuasion system, used to
market test the effectiveness of television advertisements .608 The theft
allegedly occurred as a result of meetings and negotiations for a potential
joint venture between IPSOS, a French advertising company, and RSC to
introduce a new testing system in France. 60 9 ISPOS sold a testing system
called Pre*Vision in France but wanted to develop a new system to attract
Proctor & Gamble as a new customer. 610 RSC and ISPOS signed
confidentiality agreements covering the information that the companies
would share and then had an initial visit by IPSOS representatives to RSC.6 t'
However, the two companies were unable to reach a final agreement. 612
IPSOS subsequently put together a joint proposal with two other European
companies for RSC to license ARS Persuasion in Europe.61 3 RSC rejected
the offer.614 ISPOS worked with a European company to revise its own
61 5
Pre*Vision product to make it compatible for Proctor & Gamble's use.
RSC brought suit when it learned of ISPOS's revised product.616
Numerous issues brought up on appeal included various discovery and
evidentiary admissibility questions that were disposed of in quick order and
do not warrant discussion here.617 The Court also made quick work of the
question of whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied RSC's
motion for a new trial on the trade secret misappropriation claim.618 The
Seventh Circuit cited evidence that supported the jury's determinations that
RSC had not disclosed any product information that was not generally
known or readily ascertainable. 619 The Seventh Circuit said that RSC failed
to identify any evidence that confidential information was disclosed to

606. 276 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, Ripple, Evans, JJ.). The case was appealed

from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, No. 97 C 10
(Young, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant Research Systems Corp., was Barbara
Bison Jacobson, of Bison Jacobson Law Office, Cincinnati, OH; the counsel for
defendants-appellees

PISOS Publicite, IPSOS USA, IPSOS, IPSOS America, was

Alexander Dimitrief, of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL and Ross E. Rudolph, Mattingly,
Rudolph, Fine & Porter, Evansville, IN.
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ISPOS during the tour of RSC's facility: "[t]he jury was entitled to believe
IPSOS S.A. president, Didier Truchot, who testified that IPSOS
representatives saw little more than the sight of people working in their
offices., 620 RSC also failed to demonstrate that there was insufficient
evidence that IPSOS developed its product independently of RSC
information. 621 The Court noted that "IPSOS developed Pre*Vision from
information derived from IPSOS' interactions with other European
companies and with its clients. 622
Whether to toll the three-year statute of limitations for the Indiana
Uniform Trade Secrets Act claim was an interesting point of the case.623 The
suit was filed five years after RSC learned of the purported
misappropriation. 624 However, when a defendant is a nonresident, Indiana
tolls all statutes of limitations and Indiana does not maintain a process server
for people who may be served as an agent of the defendant. 625 ISPOS was
never a resident in Indiana and did not maintain an agent or anyone else to
receive service of process.626 The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendant on this claim based on its conclusion that the tolling
provision did not excuse RSC's late filing because IPSOS could have been
timely served by certified mail pursuant to the state's long arm statute.627
The Seventh Circuit affirmed.628
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the Indiana Supreme Court had
not addressed the question, but because this was a diversity case the Seventh
629
Circuit had to attempt to predict how the Indiana high court would rule.
An Indiana appeals court had ruled, in Haton v. Haton,6 30 that the tolling
statute did not apply if the defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of the
state. 63 1 Although in Haton the defendant was subject to jurisdiction based
on continuing jurisdiction for child support payments following a divorce
decree, the district court in the RSC case deemed the long arm statute as
analogously making the defendant subject to service of process. 632 The
Seventh Circuit
noted that the tolling statute did not explicitly provide this
633
exception.
The Seventh Circuit said, however, that the exception fit within the
purpose of the statute: to preserve the plaintiffs claim until such time as

620. Id.
621. Research Systems, 276 F.3d at 921-22.
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672 N.E.2d 962, 965 (Ind.Ct. App. 1996).
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service on the defendant is made available. 634 The tolling statute served no
purpose, said the Court, where the defendant was amenable to service of
process, and it undermined the purpose of the statute of limitations to
promote diligence on the part of the plaintiff.635 The Seventh Circuit noted
that prior to a change in Indiana's long arm statute, service on nonresident
corporations could be made to the Secretary of State, but under the present
6 36
law, service on nonresident corporations was to be made by certified mail.
Thus, under prior law, the tolling provision did not apply to nonresident
corporations because they could be served via the Secretary of State. 637 The
Seventh Circuit viewed this as indicating that Indiana law permitted the rule
that the statute of limitations would not be tolled where the nonresident
defendant was subject to service of process under the long arm statute.638
C. Economic Espionage Act
In the only criminal prosecution of a trade secret to reach the Seventh
Circuit last year, United States v. Lange,639 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
conviction. 640 Lange was convicted of stealing the trade secrets of his former
employer, Replacement Aircraft Parts Co. (RAPCO) and attempting to sell it
to one of RAPCO's competitors in violation of the Economic Espionage
Act.641 The trade secret at issue was how to engineer airplane parts and how
to produce parts to meet the same or better specifications. 642 A complex part
could take more than a year and tens of thousands of dollars to design and
required substantial testing to obtain the required Federal Aviation
Administration certification. 64 Lange offered to sell for $100,000 on the
Internet the information required to obtain certification for airplane brake
components. 64 4 The FBI was notified by an informant, and arrested Lange
after obtaining taped negotiations that supplied sufficient evidence for
conviction. 645
Lange challenged the conviction, contending that the
information was not a trade secret and that his thirty-month sentence was too
long.646
The Seventh Circuit considered several aspects of the question whether
634. Id. at 925.

635. Id.

636. Id.
637. Id.
638. Research Systems Corp., 276 F.3d at 926.
639. 312 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2002) (Cudahy, Easterbrook, Ripple, JJ.). The case was
appealed from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, No.
99-CR-174 (Stadtmueller, J). The counsel for plaintiff-appellee, was Monica Rimai,
Matthew L. Jacobs, of the Office of the United States Attorney, Milwaukee, WI; the
counsel for defendant-appellant, was Bridget E. Boyle, of Boyle, Boyle & Smith,
Milwaukee, WI.
640. Lange, 312 F.3d at 271.
641. Id. at 264. The Economic Espionage Act can be found at 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).
642. Lange, 312 F.3d at 265.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id.

646. Id. at 266.

20031

Intellectual PropertyLaw in the Seventh Circuit: 2002

the information was a trade secret. First, the Court considered the
sufficiency of the measures taken to keep the information secret. 6 47 Second,
the Court looked at whether the information was not readily ascertainable by
the "public. , 64 8 Third, the Court touched on the prosecution's argument that
Lange could be convicted for an "attempted" trade secret theft, even if the
information was not sufficiently secret, if Lange thought he had real trade
secrets. 649 As to the first point, the Court was not persuaded that RAPCO
failed to take reasonable measures to maintain the information's secrecy.65 °
The Court cited the special room (for the computer assisted drawing
software, and the manufacturing data and drawings) that was protected by a
special lock, an alarm system, and a motion detector. 65' The Court noted that
the copies of the sensitive information were kept to a minimum and any
surplus copies were shredded.652 Warnings of RAPCO's intellectual
property rights were included on drawings and other manufacturing
information and were also given to every employee.653 RAPCO parceled
schematics amongst different subcontractors to ensure that none could
replicate the product, relying on this rather than an agreement 655
to protect its
confidentiality. 654 The Court deemed these measures sufficient.
The Seventh Circuit declined to answer a question of statutory
interpretation respecting the statutory requirement that the information
derived economic value "from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public."656 The
prosecution argued that "public" meant "general public," the "ordinary man
on the street. ' ' 657 The Seventh Circuit questioned this statutory construction
because the "problem with using the general public as a reference group for
identifying a trade secret is that many things unknown to the public at large
are well known to engineers, scientists, and others whose intellectual
property the Economic Espionage Act was enacted to protect. 6 58 According
to the Court "[t]his makes the general public a poor benchmark for
separating commercially valuable secrets from obscure (but generally
known) information." 659 The Seventh Circuit looked at the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, adopted by many states, which referred to the trade secret
information as the information which "derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
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ascertainable through proper means by the public." 660 Although the
prosecutor argued that the failure to include in the federal statute the
Uniform Act's limitation demonstrated Congress meant the general public,
the Seventh Circuit said that Congress could have intended "public" to be
shorthand for the "economically relevant public." 661 In this case, that would
mean engineers and aircraft parts manufacturers would have the means to
reverse engineer their competitor's products - in short, "rivals." 662 After
considering these various interpretations, however, the Court said it need not
decide which was correct because the information was "not 'readily
ascertainable' to the general public, the educated public,
the economically
663
relevant public, or any sensible proxy for these groups."
The Court also declined to decide the question of attempted trade secret
theft. 664 According to the Court, the trial judge (in this bench trial) was
entitled to find that Lange had real trade secrets. 665 However, the Court did
suggest that taking data from an ex-employer might be sufficiently likely to
contain trade secrets to justify calling the preparation for sale a substantial
666
step toward completion of the offense and thus a culpable attempt.
However, this was only a "plausible" claim, with "sensitivity to the facts,"
like what kind of data did the employee think he stole. 66 7 In any event,6 68the
Court said it was not necessary in this case to announce a definitive rule.
Lange challenged two aspects of the judge's sentencing decision. First,
Lange protested the conclusion that he had used "special skill," which added
two levels under applicable federal sentencing guidelines. 669 Lange said his
training differed from that denoted in the sentencing guideline application
note, which commented on "special skill" as follows: 'Special skill' refers to
a skill not possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring
substantial education, training or licensing. Examples would include pilots,
lawyers, doctors, accountants, chemists, and demolition experts. 670
The Seventh Circuit disagreed:
Drafting skills, including the use of AutoCAD [the computer assisted drawing
software], are "not possessed by members of the general public," require time
to master, and played a central role in the offense. A mechanical drafter is in
the same category as a pilot or
67 demolition expert-for those skills, too, may be
learned outside the academy. 1
Second, Lange protested the conclusion that he had not accepted
responsibility, which would have deducted two levels had the judge
660.
661.
662.
663.
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determined otherwise.672 According to the Court, this reduction usually
accompanied a guilty plea, but Lange went to trial and also appealed his
conviction, still arguing his innocence both on factual and legal grounds.673
Moreover, Lange did not learn his lesson; he consulted an attorney who told
him not to sell the data but Lange went ahead and did so anyway.67" He also
tried to persuade a friend to lie to the grand jury.675 This was more6 76an
obstruction of justice than an acceptance of responsibility, said the Court.
Judge Ripple concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to convey
his disapproval of the Court's confronting issues not necessary to the
decision.677 For example, Judge Ripple read the majority as having rejected
out of hand the United States' position on the meaning of "public" as
meaning "general public," notwithstanding the majority's concession that it
was not deciding the question.678 Judge Ripple noted that he would also
defer discussion on attempted trade secret theft, suggesting that a sister
circuit's decision to the contrary counseled restraint.679
D. Injunctions
The secret of enticing olive oil flavors was the subject of Lucini Italia
Company v. Guiseppe Grappolini.680 Lucini filed suit against Grappolini,
seeking a preliminary injunction for Grappolini's alleged theft of Lucini's
essential oil trade secrets. 681 The district court denied the motion several
months later, stating that the motion was moot after the parties had agreed to
maintain the status quo while engaging in settlement talks. 682 The Seventh
Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to proceed to immediate
discovery and an expedited hearing on the merits of the preliminary
injunction motion.683
Lucini was in the business of developing and marketing gourmet
foods.684 Lucini entered into an oral consulting agreement with Grappolini,
an Italian citizen who was an olive oil expert, and his company. 685 Lucini
wanted to introduce new olive oil products that would include natural
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680. 288 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2002) (Flaum, C.J., Harlington Wood, Jr., Posner, JJ.).

The case was appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois (Norgle, J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant Lucini Italia Co., was Steven C.
Florsheim, Chicago, IL; the counsel for defendants-appellees Giuseppe Grappolini and

Grappolini G. S.R.L., was Jose A. Lopez, of Schopf & Weiss, Chicago, IL.
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extracts to provide different flavors, such as garlic or lemon.686 Grappolini's
responsibility, according to Lucini but disputed by Grappolini, was to
identify Italian producers of olive oil and to study the taste and smell of
potential products. 687 Lucini was responsible for identifying target markets
and customers, establishing price points to best establish a market, and
determining which flavors to use and not to use. 688 Lucini required
Grappolini to sign confidentiality agreements respecting the information.689
Grappolini was to obtain an exclusive supply agreement between Lucini and
69 °
the Vegetal Company, located by Grappolini to produce the essential oils.
However, Grappolini himself entered into an agreement with Vegetal and
brought to market his own essential-oil-flavored olive oil, Res Essenziale. 691
Lucini filed suit for trade secret misappropriation once it learned of
Grappolini's product sales in the United States.692
The district court denied the preliminary injunction as moot, but
applied the wrong legal standard, explained the Seventh Circuit. 693 The
correct standard requires that no reasonable expectation exists that the
alleged wrong will be repeated, and the burden of proof lies with the
defendant, said the Court.694 The parties' agreement to maintain the status
quo during litigation does not deprive a federal court of its power to
determine the legality of the suspended practice. 69 Moreover, the Seventh
Circuit questioned whether the parties had indeed reached any such
agreement, particularly in view of Lucini's contention that Grappolini
continued to sell essential oil products in the United States.696 The Seventh
Circuit pointed out that the trial court had not permitted discovery respecting
the extent of Grappolini's sales and marketing, and thus any contention that
Lucini had failed to prove its entitlement on the merits to a preliminary
injunction was highly speculative.697 Although the district court had stayed
discovery pending an arbitration in Italy, the Seventh Circuit determined that
the instant dispute would not be resolved in that proceeding and thus
provided no basis for further staying discovery. 698
VI. PATENT
It might seem discordant to see a discussion of Seventh Circuit patent
appeals because the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction of patent appeals. 699 The
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influence of the Seventh Circuit on substantive patent law may be on the rise,
however, after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Holmes Group,
Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,700 holding that the Federal
Circuit does not have jurisdiction over a case with no patent claim in the
complaint yet including a patent claim as a counterclaim.70 ' The Holmes
case could signal a return in part to the era of disparate regional appellate
treatment of patents, and to a time when the Seventh Circuit provided key
702
guidance on patent substantive law.
A.

Jurisdictionand Weight of Precedent

The Seventh Circuit's patent power was virtually eliminated in 1982
with the addition of the Federal Circuit to the federal appellate landscape.70 3
The Federal Circuit was given jurisdiction of all cases from district courts
within the Seventh Circuit's geography that arose under the patent laws of
the United States.7° With its mission to increase the national uniformity and
predictability of patent law, the Federal Circuit departed from the Seventh
Circuit in both major and minor ways.
The vitality of more than one hundred years of Seventh Circuit patent
precedent 70 5 appeared to be totally swept away when the Federal Circuit
decided in South Corp. v. United States7°6 that the precedent of its
predecessor courts was binding.70 7 The natural result of the South decision
was that the Federal Circuit was required to follow the patent precedent of its
predecessor courts, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
and the United States Court of Claims, and not that of any regional circuit
courts of appeals.70 8 Although the Federal Circuit has often referred to
regional circuit law on matters of procedure, its consideration of regional
patent decisions is infrequent. One example where the Federal Circuit cited
favorably a Seventh Circuit patent decision was in A.C. Aukerman Co. v.
R.L. Chaides Construction Co.,709 where the Federal Circuit commended the
7 °
reasons stated in George J. Meyer Manufacturingv. Miller Manufacturing

700. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
701. Holmes Group, Inc., 535 U.S. at 830.
702. See generally Molly Mosley-Goren, JurisdictionalGerrymandering? Responding
to Holmes Group v. Vornado Air CirculationSystems, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2002)

(analyzing the federal court's decisions both pre- and post-Holmes Group).
703. See generally, S.REP. NO 97-275, at I-11 (1981).
704. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a).

705. The Seventh Circuit was born in 1891. Act Creating United States Circuit Court of
Appeals, 26 Stats. 826 (1981).

706. 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). This decision was the first appeal heard
and the first opinion published for the Federal Circuit. Id. at 1361.
707. SouthCorp., 690 F.2d at 1369.
708. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface ArchitecturalRes. Inc., 279 F.3d 1357,
1368 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that the Seventh Circuit patent precedent is not binding);
Broyhill FurnitureIndus. v. CraftmasterFurniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1083 n.1 (Fed.

Cir. 1993) (viewing sister circuit decisions as persuasive not binding precedent).
709. 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
710. 24 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1928).
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711
for limiting the laches defense in patent cases to the patentee's past acts.
With the return of patent counterclaim case appeals to the Seventh
Circuit, the question of how to treat its own precedent and Federal Circuit
precedent will be an interesting one to follow. One of the first cases to be
bounced from the Federal Circuit to any regional circuit was Medigene v.
Loyola.712 The Seventh Circuit has not yet decided that appeal.

B.

Licenses

The only other Seventh Circuit patent question this past year was raised
in a patent royalty diversity case. The Seventh Circuit demonstrated its
willingness to jump in with both feet on patent questions in Scheiber v.
Dolby Laboratories,Inc.713 Although the Seventh Circuit followed Supreme
Court precedent that forbade patent royalties
once a patent expired, the
714
Seventh Circuit seriously questioned the rule.
At issue were royalties from Scheiber's surround sound patents6
7
71 5
The royalties had been set in settlement of litigation. ,
licensed to Dolby.
Dolby negotiated a lower royalty rate in exchange for continued royalty
payments until the last of the patents at issue, a Canadian patent, expired.717
In the present litigation, Dolby argued that it had no duty to pay the
agreed upon royalties on equipment covered by expired patents, relying on
Brulotte v. Thys Co. 715 The district court agreed and granted summary
judgment in favor of Dolby.7 19 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.72 °
The Seventh Circuit recognized that Dolby's situation, involving an
agreement licensing patents that expired on different dates, was
indistinguishable from Brulotte. 2 While the Court deemed that precedent
dubious, it recognized it was bound to follow the Supreme Court's decision:
"[h]owever, we have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no

711. A.CAukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1040.
712. See Nos. 02-1235, 02-1308 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14503 (Fed. Cir. June 23,
2002) (transferring the appeal from the Federal Circuit to the Seventh Circuit). The case
was pending, as of the time of this article's publication, with briefs filed but no oral
argument scheduled. See Medigene AG v. Medimmune, Inc., No. 02-2743, available at
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/briefs.htm. (last visited September 8, 2003).
713. 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, Evans, Williams, JJ.) The case was
appealed from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 95 C
1531 No. 01-2466 (Goodich, Mag. J.). The counsel for plaintiff-appellant and patent
owner, was Daniel J. Lueders, of Woodard, Emhardt, Naughton, Moriarty & McNett,
Indianapolis, IN; the counsel for defendants-appellees and patent licensees, was John L
Cooper, of Farella, Braun & Martel, San Francisco, CA, Edward W. Harris, 1II, Sommer &
Barnard, Indianapolis, IN, and for co-defendant-appellee, Seven R. Lowenthal, Farella,
Braun & Martel, San Francisco, CA.
714. Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1017, 1023.
715. Id. at 1016.
716. Id.
717. Id.
718. Id. at 1017; Brullotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
719. Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1023.
720. Id.
721. Id. at 1017-18.
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matter how dubious its reasoning strikes us, or even how out of touch with
the Supreme Court's current thinking the decision seems. 722 The problem
with Brulotte, according to the Seventh Circuit, was as follows: "[t]he
duration of the patent fixes the limit of the patentee's power to extract
royalties; it is a detail whether he extracts them at a higher rate over a shorter
period of time or a lower rate over a longer period of time."7 23 Thus, the
Supreme Court was wrong to assume that post-expiration payments reflect
an extension of the patent rather than an amortization of its price, said the
Seventh Circuit. 724 The Seventh Circuit noted that Brulotte had been
"severely" and "justly" criticized, beginning in the dissent and continuing in
law review articles.725
Scheiber proposed two grounds for disregarding Brulotte, but the
Seventh Circuit was persuaded by neither. First, Scheiber argued that the
1988 amendment to the patent law indicated that Congress intended to
overrule Brulotte.726 The amendment limited the reach of the patent misuse
defense to infringement, providing in Section 271 (d)(5) of the patent statute
that:
no patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement ... shall be...
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his
having ... conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the
patented product on the acquisition
of a license to rights in another patent or
727
purchase of a separate product.
The Seventh Circuit said that this did not excuse post-expiration royalties
because it applied to infringement suits, which this was not.728
Also, the Court said the provision was limited to tying.7 29 The Court
viewed the rationale of tying cases, where a seller tries to charge a monopoly
price for a product tied to another monopoly-priced product, as "economic
nonsense, imputing systematic irrationality to businessmen."' 730 However,
the bundling of the duration of royalty payments was not tying, so the
provision did not apply.73 ' The Seventh Circuit also rejected Scheiber's
argument that the unclean hands doctrine should preclude applying Brulotte
to the instant case because it was Dolby who proposed the license duration in
the first place.732 The Court said applying the doctrine of unclean hands
would totally undermine the policy of refusing enforcement to contracts for

722.
723.
724.
725.
726.
727.
728.

Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1017.
Id.at 1017-18.
Id. at 1017.
Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 10 19-20.
Id. at 1019.
Id.

729. Id.
at 1019-20.
730. Id.
at 1020.
731. Id. at 1020-21. However, the court noted that one district court in Sunrise Medical
HHG v. AirSep Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 348, 357-59 (W.D. Pa. 2000) concluded that the
1988 amendment did overrule Brulotte. Id. at 1021.
732. Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1021.
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the payment of patent royalties after expiration of the patent.733
As demonstrated by the Scheiber case, patent cases sometimes raise
antitrust issues.734 In the following antitrust case, patent law is discussed
despite the absence of patent infringement claims. The trial court in In re
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation735 granted summary
judgment in favor of defendant wholesale sellers of drugs on claims of price
fixing in violation of the Sherman Act and against retail sellers of
prescription drugs. 73 6 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the trial
court that there was too little conspiracy evidence against the middlemen
wholesalers to infer knowledge or joinder in the alleged antitrust
violations.737
This antitrust case tangentially related to both patents and trademarks.
The case alleged price discrimination between generics and brand name
drugs.738 The Court suggested that multiple manufacturers without collusion
could not maintain a price differential if the brand-name drugs were
interchangeable with generics.739
However, if the drugs were not
interchangeable, then each individual manufacturer might be able to engage
in price discrimination. 740 The Court suggested that price discrimination
might be maintained whether because of chemical differences protected by
patents or because of perceived differences having to do with a1
74
manufacturer's reputation or his advertising or other promotional activity.
"Just as copyrights give the publisher a temporary monopoly of each book he
publishes, so patents give manufacturers of drugs a temporary monopoly of
733. Id. at 1021-22.
734. See generally USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., 694 F.2d 505, 510-512 (7th Cir. 1982)

(looking at the anticompetitive effects of patent misuse); Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse:
Must An Alleged Infringer Prove an Antitrust Violation, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 10-11 (1989)

(noting that patent misuse is intertwined with anti-trust issues).
735. 288 F.3d 1028 (7th Cir. 2002), (Bauer, Posner, Easterbrook, JJ.) The case was
appealed from the United States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois, No. 94
CV 897 (Kocoras, C. Judge). The counsel for plaintiffs-appellants was Lawrence Adams,
Mark Vehik, of McMath Law Firm, Little Rock, AR and David Boies, Boies, of Schiller &
Flexner, Armonk, NY, for Paradise Drugs, Bob's Pharmacy and Robar One, Melvyn
Segal, Forster & Segal, San Jose, CA and David Boics, for Ace Pharmacy, Adams Drug,
Advance Drugs, Ackal's and Agler Drug, Mary Boies, Boies & McGinnis, Beford, NY
and Nicholas A. Gravante, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, and David Boies, for Rite Aid,
Revco, Snyder's Drug, Perry Drug, Smith's Food and Drug, Steve D. Shadowen,
Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Harrisburg, PA and David Boies, for Malley's
Pharmacy, Meijer, Brookshire Bros., Pharmhouse, Publix Supermarkets, Paul E. Slater,
Sperling, Slater & Spitz, Chicago, IL; counsel for defendants Bergen Brunswig Corp.,
Melvin R. Goldman, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, CA, for Bindley Western Indus.,
Donald C. McLean, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, DC, for Cardinal
Health and Whitmire Distribution, Thomas L. Long, Baker & Hostetler, Columbus, OH,
for Foxmeyer Drug Co., Alan Weinschel, Weil, Gotschal & Manges, and for McKesson
Corp., J. Thomas Rosch, Latham & Watkins, San Francisco, CA.
736. In re BrandName, 288 F.3d at 1029-30.
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each drug he manufactures.
742

These monopolies create preconditions for

discriminatory pricing.,

This case appears to suggest that a patent provides a presumptive
monopoly, without concomittantly examining the patentee's market power or
the presence of other competitors; thus, the case continues a difference of
viewpoint between the Seventh and the Federal Circuit respecting the
association between patent and monopoly. 43
Differences of viewpoint, if indeed they exist, between the Seventh
Circuit and the Federal Circuit might be supposed to be a result of the
different jurisdictions. Judge Posner has suggested that judges with strong
backgrounds in an area of law may bring strong ideological views to cases in
that area.7 44 Consequently, decisions of a specialized court comprised of
"expert" judges might be open to criticism according to Judge Posner. 745
The same criticism, however questionable, could be leveled at generalist
judges with strong backgrounds in an area of law, say economic analysts of
the law. Judge Posner has also expressed some antipathy toward the patent
bar, in his book Overcoming Law, describing the patent bar as self-interested
and guild-like in nature. 746 The potential for circuit splits on patent law may
be expected to be closely monitored by those interested in either court.
V. CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Seventh Circuit applied existing
precedent for most of its decisions. However, the Court announced several
departures and provided practical and valuable guidance to IP practitioners.
The Court accomplished this with its characteristic flair, and those who
follow the Court look forward with interest to another year.
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